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CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY: IP LICENSES AS A
CASE STUDY
Michal Shur-Ofry* & Ofer Tur-Sinai**

Ambiguity in contracts is often perceived as undesirable. A certain level of ambiguity, however, can have significant virtues: reducing transaction costs associated
with foreseeing and negotiating remote contingencies; facilitating the closing of efficient transactions that would not otherwise close; increasing the adaptability and
“anti-fragility” of contracts in the face of unforeseen developments; and preserving
trust between the parties.
Some contracts are more likely to benefit from a certain degree of ambiguity. Relying
on multi-disciplinary literature, this Article systematically analyzes ambiguity’s
merits and identifies three principal features of transactions that are positively correlated to the virtues of ambiguity: (1) long duration, (2) relational nature, and
(3) complexity and uncertainty of the transaction and the relevant markets. As a
case study, this Article considers intellectual property (IP) licenses negotiated between sophisticated parties. IP license agreements exhibit the above three
transactional features, which are tightly linked to the unique attributes of intellectual property, including its non-rival nature, tacit knowledge surrounding formal
IP rights, and significant uncertainty embedded in IP rights and markets. This
Article thus concludes that IP licenses constitute paradigmatic candidates for “constructive ambiguity.”
This Article further demonstrates that within a specific transaction ambiguity may
be more effective for certain types of provisions and topics and proposes new guidelines for addressing ambiguity in a given contract. This Article’s proposal is based
on a distinction between core and periphery issues, which it measures using three
parameters: (1) probability, (2) significance, and (3) timing. When, from an ex
ante perspective, the relevant provision concerns the core aspects of the transaction,
ambiguity is generally unwarranted, and courts’ ex post treatment of it should be
less tolerant. Yet, when the provision is closer to the periphery of the transaction,
ambiguity is often efficient, and courts reviewing the contract should treat it more
liberally. While the proposed model addresses ambiguity in IP licenses as its case
study, it can have broader implications for contract law in general.

*
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INTRODUCTION
The term “constructive ambiguity” is often credited to Henry Kissinger, who reportedly used ambiguity as a negotiating technique in
international agreements.1 This Article explores the role of “constructive ambiguity” in contractual settings and focuses on
intellectual property (IP) licenses as a case study.
The legal system has long struggled with the best way to handle
ambiguity in contracts. Should courts facing an ambiguous contract
provision employ a contextual interpretation or confine themselves
to the “four corners” of the agreement? Should they fill in the gaps
in the parties’ agreement or declare the contract invalid due to indefiniteness? Contract law includes various doctrinal tools for
courts to use in the face of ambiguous provisions.2 Yet, the consequences of ambiguity—in particular, whether contract validity and
interpretation doctrines should tolerate or “punish” it—are largely
debated and continue to attract scholarly attention.3
While an incomplete contract may intuitively seem undesirable,
maintaining a certain degree of ambiguity in negotiated contracts
can be economically efficient in reality. Ambiguity decreases the ex
ante transaction costs associated with contract negotiation and allows to conclude transactions that otherwise would not close.
Ambiguity works particularly well in relational contracts, where reciprocity and mutual dependence often give rise to ex post
cooperation mechanisms that may render detailed ex ante negotiations unnecessary. In addition, abstaining from explicit drafting
may foster trust between the parties and positively impact their ability to resolve disputes during the lifetime of the contract.
Furthermore, in an inherently unpredictable commercial reality, a
certain level of ambiguity increases the contract’s adaptability and
“anti-fragility,” which makes the transaction more robust in the face
of post-contractual developments.
1.
WALTER ISAACSON, KISSINGER: A BIOGRAPHY 556 (2d ed. 2005).
2.
See infra Part I.B. This Article uses the term “ambiguity” in a broad sense, covering a
wide range of scenarios. Some non-exhaustive examples include the use of vague or ambiguous language, the use of open standards rather than delineating the parties’ obligations in
detail, internal inconsistencies, or a failure to address a contingency. For a detailed discussion, see infra Part I.A.
3.
For recent works addressing different aspects of this issue, see generally, for example, Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of Corporate
Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848 (2010); Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Metaphors, Models, and Meaning in
Contract Law, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 987 (2012); Gregory M. Duhl, Conscious Ambiguity: Slaying
Cerberus in the Interpretation of Contractual Inconsistencies, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 71 (2009); Adam B.
Badawi, Interpretive Preferences and the Limits of the New Formalism, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1 (2009);
Elizabeth C. Spencer, Consequences of the Interaction of Standard Form and Relational Contracting
in Franchising, 29 FRANCHISE L.J. 31 (2009).
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While economic and legal literature have examined some of
these advantages of ambiguity, other benefits have hardly been explored. This Article offers a systematic analysis of the virtues of
contractual ambiguity by building on existing scholarship, as well as
on cutting-edge multi-disciplinary research in the social sciences
and in the field of complex systems. This inquiry demonstrates that
the virtues of ambiguity positively correlate to certain transaction
traits. In other words, certain types of contracts are more likely than
others to benefit from some degree of ambiguity. Based on this theoretical inquiry, this Article identifies three principal transaction
characteristics that are positively related to constructive ambiguity:
(1) long duration, (2) relational nature, and (3) complexity and
uncertainty of the transaction and the relevant market.
As a case study, this Article looks closely at IP licenses negotiated
between sophisticated parties, a category of contracts the prism of
contract law has insufficiently explored. This Article argues that
these licenses constitute paradigmatic cases for constructive ambiguity, due to the prevalence of the foregoing three transaction
criteria. It further demonstrates that these transaction features are
strongly linked to the unique nature of intellectual property, in particular IP’s non-rival nature, the tacit knowledge surrounding
formal IP rights, and the uncertainty embedded both in the rights
themselves as well as in technology markets.
This Article argues that even within “ambiguity-friendly” transactions, ambiguity may be more efficient with respect to certain types
of issues. Building on its analysis of the virtues of ambiguity it proposes new guidelines for identifying specific issues within
transactions that may be more disposed to constructive ambiguity.
The proposal is based on a distinction between core and periphery
matters, a distinction based on weighing three parameters: (1)
probability, (2) significance, and (3) timing. When the relevant
provision in the agreement concerns matters that could be considered, ex ante, as core aspects of the transaction, ambiguity is
generally unwarranted, and courts’ ex post treatment should be less
tolerant. If, on the other hand, the matter seems closer to the periphery of the agreement—for example, if it deals with events that
could be considered, ex ante, as remote, unlikely, or insignificant—
ambiguity is often efficient, and courts should display more tolerance toward it during ex post review. While the model addresses
ambiguity in IP licenses as its case study, it has broader implications
for contracts in general.
Although this Article’s inquiry highlights the virtues of ambiguity, it does not advocate “the death of the contract,” nor undermine
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the value of clear drafting. It does argue, however, that within the
universe of contracts, it is possible to delineate particular transactions, and specific provisions within such transactions, where the
benefits of ambiguity are greater and its costs lower. This insight
should influence the legal system’s ex post treatment of ambiguity
and provide the courts with normative directions when treating ambiguous provisions. The guidelines proposed in this Article can also
be helpful for parties to transactions, and their attorneys, when
drafting their agreements.
By exploring the interaction of contract and intellectual property
law, this Article contributes to both branches of law. For contract
law, this Article presents a systematic analysis of the virtues of contractual ambiguity, identifies transaction settings and types of issues
where such virtues are more prominent, and proposes new normative guidelines for courts addressing ambiguous provisions. For
intellectual property law, this Article offers a structured inquiry into
the attributes of IP licenses and their link to the unique nature of
intellectual property. Scholarship has largely overlooked these aspects of IP licenses, and exploring them may have normative
consequences beyond the context of contractual ambiguity.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides necessary background, explores various types of contractual ambiguity, and
describes the current doctrinal treatment of ambiguity and the prevailing scholarly attitudes toward it. Part II systematically explores
the virtues of ambiguity and demonstrates the positive relationship
between these virtues and certain transaction characteristics. Part
III applies the preceding analysis to IP licenses by exploring prominent characteristics of IP licenses and illustrating that these
agreements constitute paradigmatic cases for constructive ambiguity. Finally, Part IV outlines the Article’s proposed guidelines for ex
post treatment of ambiguity.

I. CONTRACTUAL AMBIGUITY—BACKGROUND
Before commencing the inquiry of contractual ambiguity, one
clarification is in order. This Article’s discussion is confined to contracts between sophisticated parties of (approximately) equal
bargaining power, which lawyers typically negotiate.4 Standard form
4.
This Article generally does not distinguish between the parties and their representatives and assumes for the purposes of its analysis that their interests coincide. For a discussion
of potential conflicts of interest between parties and their representatives, see, for example,
Royce de R. Barondes, The Business Lawyer as Terrorist Transaction Cost Engineer, 69 FORDHAM L.
REV. 31, 52–56 (2000). See also infra note 105.

WINTER 2015]

Constructive Ambiguity

395

contracts, including shrink-wrap, click-wrap, and browse-wrap licenses that are prevalent in technology transactions,5 are outside
the scope of this Article’s analysis.

A. Types of Ambiguity
The term “ambiguity” is used in this Article in a rather loose and
elaborate manner to cover a wide range of scenarios, including, inter alia, vague, open-ended, inconsistent, or incomplete contractual
provisions. In all such circumstances, the contract, as drafted, falls
short of the (illusory) ideal of a “complete contract” that thoroughly addresses all possible contingencies.6 This Article’s analysis
neither necessitates a careful distinction between the various types
of ambiguity nor does it aim to offer a complete list of such scenarios.7 The types of ambiguity and the examples discussed in the
following paragraphs are non-exhaustive and merely illustrate typical circumstances to which this Article’s analysis applies. Since this
Article focuses on IP licenses, the illustrations for different types of
ambiguity are all derived from a variety of IP license agreements.8

1. Vague or Ambiguous Language
One common type of ambiguity in contracts is vague or ambiguous language. A contract provision may include a term or a word
5.
For a brief reference to “shrink-wrap,” “click-wrap” and “browse-wrap” licenses, see
infra note 121.
6.
Cf. Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in Contract, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 997, 999
(1992) (using the term “incomplete contract” to describe “any contract short of the ideal of a
complete contingent contract, which has been drafted with all contingencies in mind and
provides for optimal performance on every contingency.”). Notably, as the analysis below
demonstrates, the “ideal” of a perfect or complete contract is very much illusory: not only is it
impossible to obtain, it is also unwarranted for various solid reasons. See infra Part II.
7.
For various attempts to distinguish between different types of ambiguity, see, for
example, Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 267–73 (1985)
(listing the following types of “formulation errors”: administrative error, ambiguity, incompleteness, inconsistency, interpretation error, and ill-fitting formulations); Duhl, supra note
3, at 78 (listing the following types of “interpretation and implication problems”: open terms,
incompleteness, vagueness, ambiguity, and inconsistent terms); Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD.
271, 272 (1992) (referring to an additional type of incompleteness, where the contract “partitions future states or potential contracting partners ‘too coarsely’ ”).
8.
The examples in this Part are derived from “real world” licenses: some appear in
case law and others are on file with the authors (in which case the parties’ identity and other
identifying details are omitted).
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that is “capable of more than one sensible and reasonable interpretation” or has “no definite significance.”9 This phenomenon is far
from rare in IP licenses which often address cutting-edge technologies and use terminology that is still developing and not entirely
universal.
For example, broadcasting rights agreements regularly limit the
platforms on which a licensee may broadcast the licensed content.
A contract may confine a licensee’s rights to “free TV,” “subscription TV,” “IPTV,” “PAY TV,” or other specific forms of broadcasting.
Yet, many of these terms carry more than one meaning. Consider a
broadcasting license that limits the grant of rights to “free TV.”10
While this term often refers to “over the air” terrestrial channels, it
can also refer to basic-tier channels in subscription television (e.g.,
cable or satellite). Likewise, the term “IPTV” (Internet Protocol Television) in a content transmission license11 usually implies that the
content is delivered over the licensee’s own internet infrastructure.
Yet, in some cases, the term IPTV may refer to “over the top” broadcasting, namely to content that is transmitted over the public
internet rather than on the licensee’s infrastructure.12 As is obvious
from these examples, such ambiguous language can cast significant
doubt on the precise content of the rights granted under the license in various factual circumstances.13

2. Open Standards
Another type of ambiguity is an “open standard.” Parties to a contract often use open-ended standards for describing certain
9.
Ross Bros. Constr. Co. v. State ex rel Transp. Comm’n, Highway Div., 59 Or. App.
374, 650 P.2d 1080, 1082 (1982). For a distinction between “vague” and “ambiguous” terms,
see, for example, Goetz & Scott, supra note 7, 268–69 n.13 (1985) (discussing the linguistic
difference between the two but noting that courts often do not make such distinctions);
Duhl, supra note 3, 83–84 (maintaining that a vague term is “one that has a range of meanings in a context,” while an ambiguous term is “one in which there are two different
meanings in context, such that one meaning excludes the others”).
10. License on file with the authors.
11. IPTV is a system for delivering television services over the internet protocol instead
of through traditional media such as cable, satellite, or terrestrial broadcasting. Examples
include TV services offered by Verizon FiOS and AT&T U-verse.
12. See, e.g., Harry Bouwman, Meng Zhengjia, Patrick van der Duin & Sander Limonard,
A Business Model for IPTV Service: a Dynamic Framework, 10 INFO 3, 22–23 (2008) (discussing
IPTV provided by telecom operators over their infrastructure yet noting that IPTV may also
include web-based television delivered over the internet protocol). Prominent examples for
“over the top” service providers are Netflix and Hulu.
13. Cf. Goetz & Scott, supra note 7, at 268 (“When a signal instruction has more than
one possible meaning, the same set of factual conditions may generate alternate sets of prescribed consequences.”).
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obligations rather than delineating such obligations and undertakings in detail.14 Familiar examples include “best efforts,” “industry
standards,” or the various common uses of “reasonableness” (for
example, “commercially reasonable manner” or “a consent not to
be unreasonably withheld”). To illustrate, consider the following
provisions, which appear in three different software license agreements and their appended Service Level Agreements (SLA)15:
If a solution for a Severity 2 Error is unavailable immediately,
Licensor shall make its best efforts to provide an acceptable
workaround within a reasonable time.
All Services performed under this Agreement shall be provided in a professional and workmanlike manner, using due
care, consistent with prevailing industry standards.
Licensor shall continually improve its design and delivery of
Services, and implement quality assurance processes and procedures necessary to perform the Services in accordance with
industry standards.
By employing open terms, the parties refrain from explicitly addressing the level of effort, the anticipated manpower allocation, or
the exact response times of the licensors in providing services to
their licensees. These details are deferred to a later stage. Similarly,
a license for the development and marketing of a pharmaceutical
product maintains16:
LICENCEE shall launch the Product in the Territory at the
earliest commercially reasonable date . . . .
The open language in this case is a substitute for setting a definitive launch date for the product. In the event of a dispute the
question of whether the licensee did, in fact, launch the product at
“the earliest commercially reasonable date” may need to be resolved by a court.
14. See Gergen, supra note 6, at 998–99 (describing “open terms” as “contractual provisions that expressly grant a party substantial, but not completely unfettered, discretion in
performance”); cf. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. J.
557 (1992) (discussing the use of open standards in the design of legal norms).
15. A Service Level Agreement (SLA) typically defines and details the quality and availability of the services available to a provider’s customers. See, e.g., W. Kuan Hon, Christopher
Millar & Ian Walden, Negotiating Cloud Contracts: Looking at Clouds from Both Sides Now, 16
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 81, 95 (2012) (defining SLAs as “commitments on availability levels and
performance”). Licenses on file with the authors (emphases added).
16. License on file with the authors (emphasis added).
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3. Internal Inconsistencies
In other instances, a contract may include two or more provisions that are prima facie inconsistent and contain conflicting
instructions.17 While each provision, in itself, may make perfect
sense, reconciling them within a single contract may not be simple.
For example, the following sections from a broadcasting rights
agreement address the issue of rights in the televised contents18:
(i) [LICENSOR] represents that it is and will be at all times . . .
owner of all Intellectual Property Rights and other rights required in order to license the broadcasts of the Programs by
Licensee in the Territory . . . including, without limitation, all
necessary broadcasting, performance rights, copyright, and related rights . . . [LICENSOR] shall indemnify and hold
[LICENSEE] harmless with respect to any breach of this warranty . . . .
(xvii) [LICENSEE] undertakes, at its own expense, to make
suitable arrangements with the relevant collecting societies in
relation to the rights for musical works included in the Programs . . . in the Territory.
While under section (i) of this agreement the licensor assumes
full responsibility regarding the entire rights in the televised contents and indemnifies the licensee, section (xvii) imposes a
separate, seemingly contradictory responsibility on the licensee for
obtaining rights for the music used in the televised programming.
The following software license clauses, which address the issue of
derivative works, provide another example of inconsistent provisions. Derivative works are sometimes developed by the licensee
using the underlying code in the licensor’s software. While one section of the license in question provides that the “[l]icensee has a
right in all derivative works, other than Pre-Existing Materials,” the
“Pre-Existing Materials” definition appears inherently inconsistent
because it includes “the Licensed Technology and any and all modifications and/or enhancements thereof.”19

17.
18.
19.

See Goetz & Scott, supra note 7, at 271.
License on file with the authors.
License on file with the authors (emphasis added).
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4. Failure to Address a Contingency
Lastly, a contract may simply avoid addressing a certain scenario
or its consequences, despite their potential relevance to the transaction.20 For example, a trademark license agreement that was the
subject of recent litigation contained a limitation-of-liability clause
that barred the recovery of lost profits and other consequential
damages but failed to elaborate whether “lost profits” included lost
future royalties.21
Likewise, a license to market, distribute, and sell a pharmaceutical product may provide that the license shall be valid for “ten (10)
years after the first commercial sale of the Product in the Territory”22 but, at the same time, may refrain from clarifying whether
“the first commercial sale” includes transfers of free product samples to third parties.
****
Some of the ambiguous provisions addressed in this Part seem to
result from the parties’ conscious decision. For example, “reasonableness,” “industry standards,” and other open-ended terms signal
the parties’ intent to avoid detailed drafting and defer the specific
contents of the “open” standard to a later stage, possibly to a court’s
decision.23 Other types of ambiguity discussed above may, at first
sight, seem like the parties’ unintentional omissions or mistakes.
Indeed, some commentators classify inconsistencies, lacunae, and
20. Cf. Goetz & Scott, supra note 7, at 270 (describing this scenario as an “incompleteness error” and further arguing that such errors typically occur when the parties
inadvertently overlook a low probability contingency).
21. Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Northshore Power Sys., LLC, No. 652163/10, 2011 WL 3198877
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jul. 25, 2011), aff’d, 96 A.D.3d 581 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012).
22. License on file with the authors.
23. One additional scenario of “open language” is the prevalent practice of “agree[ing]
not to agree,” where parties explicitly defer a topic for future negotiations, indicating their
intention to reach a separate agreement on that matter should it arise. Some commentators
classify this technique as an additional type of ambiguity or incompleteness. See, e.g., Duhl,
supra note 3, at 79 (referring to terms left to be fixed by later agreement as “open”); Ian
Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations under Classical, Neoclassical, and
Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 870 (1978) (arguing that there is not necessarily a substantial difference between “an agreement not to agree” and other types of
contractual gaps). Yet, as opposed to the use of “open standards” that signal the parties’
intent to submit the specific contents of their agreement to the courts’ discretion should a
dispute arise, the parties that “agree not to agree” generally send an opposite signal. Cf.
Macneil, supra at 870 (indicating that courts commonly tend to hold that “an agreement not
to agree is not a contract”). This Article, therefore, tends to exclude this type of contractual
incompleteness from the scope of its analysis. See also infra notes 208–209 and accompanying
text.
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vague terms as contractual errors.24 Yet, as the analysis in the following Parts demonstrates, this first impression is not necessarily
true.25 These types of ambiguity may also result from conscious
drafting choices and significantly benefit the parties.
Often, these choices are not a product of the parties’ explicit
joint decision. Rather, the dynamics of sophisticated negotiations
are such that one party may draft a provision to protect its interests,
and the other party may amend that provision to protect its own
interests by making the provision more ambiguous, or may add a
separate provision that is not fully consistent with the original provision. Likewise, both parties may consciously choose to “remain
silent” and refrain from addressing a possible contingency. The end
result may be increased ambiguity that leaves each party with a sufficient basis to argue in its own favor should a dispute arise.26 While
ambiguity is not always a result of these dynamics,27 the analysis below does not necessitate an inquiry into the exact sources and
history of ambiguity in each particular case.

B. Ambiguity and Contract Law Doctrines
How should courts treat an ambiguous contractual provision?
Contract law includes numerous doctrinal tools that can be employed in the face of ambiguity.28 One prominent example is the
doctrine of indefiniteness, which holds that a contract is unenforceable if its terms are too indefinite.29 Additional examples include a
variety of (sometimes conflicting) principles of construction, interpretation, and admissibility.
24. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 7, at 268–72 (discussing various types of “formulation errors”).
25. See infra Part II.
26. For similar observations, see Lipshaw, supra note 3, at 1009 (indicating that parties
often use “negotiated ambiguities” in order to close their deal) and 1010–11 (arguing that
the task of a contract drafter is to give “the best possible hand to play in the game of after-thefact legal argumentation”).
27. Among the other factors the literature identifies as potential causes for ambiguity
are: sloppiness (see Duhl, supra note 3, at 76 n.29), inadvertence (see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS 481 (4th ed. 2004); Schwartz, supra note 7, at 278–81), and a party’s attempt to
keep information about its preferences and strategic long-term plans private (see Eileen Y.
Chou, Nir Halevy & J. Keith Murnighan, The Relational Costs of Complete Contracts 6 (unpublished manuscript) (June 25, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1872569).
28. Since state law governs contract law, there exists some diversity among the various
States with regard to the scope and content of the relevant rules and doctrines. Regardless,
this Article’s analysis does not necessitate a detailed review of the contractual doctrines or the
differences in their scope and application among various States.
29. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, at 201.
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Some of the interpretive rules confine the courts to the “four
corners” of the agreement and hinder the introduction of extrinsic
and contextual evidence in interpreting the contract’s provisions.30
Among these is the parol evidence rule, which bars the introduction of external evidence to contradict the written terms of a
contract that appears to be a final expression of the parties’ intent.31 Another is the plain meaning rule, under which a court must
enforce a facially clear and unambiguous written agreement according to the plain meaning of its terms, without considering
extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent.32
Yet, other rules permit wider use of contextual evidence and allow reference to a prior course of dealing, trade usage, or a
subsequent course of performance between the parties to interpret,
supplement, or qualify the contract.33 Additional tools include a variety of state-supplied “implied terms” and default rules that courts
may use to fill in gaps or lacunae in the parties’ agreement,34 An
additional example is the use of the good faith principle to supplement or interpret the written contract in various manners.35
Notably, no consensus exists as to the appropriate usage of this
toolbox of rules and doctrines in the face of ambiguous provisions,
and ambiguity’s normative consequences are still largely debated.
For over a century, both courts and scholars have drifted between a
formalist approach, under which courts are generally expected to
30. See, e.g., Duhl, supra note 3, at 99–101 (describing the “four corners” principle).
31. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, at 415–18 (4th ed. 2004); James B. Thayer, The
“Parol Evidence” Rule, 6 HARV. L. REV. 417, 418 (1892–1893); Goetz & Scott, supra note 7, at
273.
32. Goetz & Scott, supra note 7, at 273; FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, at 462–66. There
are, however, conflicting views regarding the question whether evidence of prior negotiation
can be used to determine whether the disputed language is clear or ambiguous. See, e.g.,
FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, at 463–66.
33. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, at 469–70; Goetz & Scott, supra note 7, at 274;
U.C.C. § 1-303 (amended 2012) (explicitly acknowledging recourse to these sources in contract construction).
34. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, at 484–85 (describing the process of “implication,” by which courts imply terms in the absence of relevant contract language).
35. The duty to perform contractual obligations in good faith is a foundational contract
law principle. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-304 (amended 2012); see also Richard E. Speidel, The Characteristics and Challenges of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 823, 838 (2000) (calling for “a
more comprehensive, sophisticated development of the duty of good faith” under U.S. contract law). Additional tools that are less relevant to this Article’s analysis are doctrines that
allow courts to adjust contracts ex post under certain circumstances. These include, for example, impossibility of performance, frustration of purpose, and common mistake. See Macneil,
supra note 23, at 875 (referring to the aforesaid doctrines and indicating that “[w]here the
parties are unable to agree to adjustments to reflect changes in circumstances, neoclassical
contract law provides a limited array of doctrines whereby one party may escape some or all
the consequences of the change”). For reference to such doctrines under Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, see U.C.C. §§ 2-614, 2-615, and 2-616 (amended 2012).
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adhere to the express terms of the written agreement36 and a more
flexible, contextualist approach, under which courts are more encouraged to complete contractual gaps and interpret contract
provisions contextually.37 While the Uniform Commercial Code
and the Second Restatement of Contracts generally reflect the contextualist school of thought,38 numerous courts still employ various
formalist rules of construction in adjudicating contract cases.39
Moreover, contract scholarship in recent decades has witnessed a
resurgence of formalism on various grounds.40 This “new formalism” has been described as “pragmatic at its core,”41 and its
supporters argue that courts are incompetent to complete gaps or

36. See, e.g., Macneil, supra note 23, at 863 (noting that classical contract law “limits
strictly the sources to be considered in establishing the substantive content of the transaction”); Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 847, 851
(2000) (noting that under the formalist approach, courts are instructed “to enforce the
(facially unambiguous) express terms of the contract literalistically or ‘as written.’ ”); Goetz &
Scott, supra note 7, at 273 (describing the “traditional common law interpretive approach”).
37. See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Relational Contracts Floating on the Sea of Custom? Thoughts
about the Ideas of Ian Macneil and Lisa Bernstein, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 775, 801 (2000) (indicating,
in support of this approach, that “if we are concerned with real expectations, that is, with
reasonable reliance and good faith, then we cannot be satisfied with only formal written
documents”). For the use of “form” versus “substance” terminology in this context, see generally Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 496 (2004). See also Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation
and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710 (1997).
38. See, e.g., Speidel, supra note 35, at 825 (referring to “modern” contract law as employing a more contextualist approach); Goetz & Scott, supra note 7, at 274 (noting that under
the “activist” approach reflected in the U.C.C. and the Second Restatement of Contracts,
“[e]vidence derived from experience and practice can now trigger the incorporation of additional, implied terms”). For relevant U.C.C. provisions, see, for example, § 1-201(3)
(defining “Agreement” as “the bargain of the parties in fact, as found in their language or
inferred from other circumstances, including course of performance, course of dealing, or
usage of trade”) and § 1-303 (defining and providing details regarding the potential use of
“course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade”). For relevant Restatement
provisions, see, for example, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 204 (Supplying an Omitted Essential Term), § 221 (Usage Supplementing an agreement), § 222 (Usages of Trade),
and § 223 (Course of Dealing) (1979).
39. Two examples that are far from exhaustive are GMG Capital Investments, LLC v. Athenian Venture Partners I, L.P., 36 A.3d 776, 779 (Del. 2012) (“When interpreting a contract, the
Court will give priority to the parties’ intentions as reflected in the four corners of the agreement.”), and Hillside Metro Associates, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat. Ass’n, No. 10-CV-1772,
2011 WL 5008368, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2011) (“[W]here the language . . . [of the contract] is unambiguous on its face, it must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its
terms.”).
40. Prominent examples include the following: Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical
Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 777 (1999);
Scott, supra note 36, at 851; Schwartz, supra note 7, at 272; and Alan Schwartz & Robert E.
Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 583–84 (2003).
41.

Scott, supra note 36, at 851 n.11.
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adjust contract terms where the parties were unable to do so
themselves.42
Yet, from a normative perspective, it is difficult to generate clear
guidelines for the legal system’s treatment of ambiguous contracts
without first exploring ambiguity’s merits (and its shortcomings). A
structured discussion of the virtues of ambiguity is thus a crucial
step in this Article’s attempt to identify circumstances where ambiguity should be treated with more leniency and to develop a more
coherent framework for the treatment of ambiguous provisions.
The next Part embarks upon this exploration.

II. THE VIRTUES

OF

OF THE

AMBIGUITY AND
TRANSACTION

THE

TRAITS

As indicated above, courts, scholars, and practitioners frequently
perceive contractual ambiguity as undesirable.43 The prominent argument maintains that ambiguous provisions raise litigation and
enforcement costs.44 Others contend that there is greater potential
for judicial error in enforcement where the contract’s language is
more ambiguous.45
Neither of these arguments is free of doubt. Several scholars have
criticized the assumption that courts are ill-equipped to interpret
and complete ambiguous contracts.46 Some maintain that judges do
have sufficient verifiable information concerning the transaction.47
42.

See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECOLAW 277 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (expressing a pessimistic view of to the
ability of courts to complete contracts with efficient defaults); Speidel, supra note 35, at 844
(reviewing this argument); Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete Contracts, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 162 (1994) (maintaining that courts lack
competence to fill in contractual gaps); Schwartz, supra note 7, at 272–73 (doubting the
ability of courts to supply efficient defaults). But see infra notes 46–51 and accompanying text.
43. See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text. See also Goetz & Scott, supra note 7, at
267–71 (listing ambiguity, incompleteness, and inconsistencies as examples for “formulation
errors”) and 311 (arguing that the law should provide incentives for the reduction of such
errors); Duhl, supra note 3, at 76–77 (arguing that “courts should discourage lawyers from
drafting intentionally ambiguous contracts”).
44. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 6, at 1062; Karen Eggleston, Eric Posner & Richard
Zeckhauser, The Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 NW. U. L. REV.
91, 119 (2000–2001). A related claim is that ambiguity increases the costs of monitoring the
performance of the contract post-execution. See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 3, at 35.
45. See, e.g, Macneil, supra note 23, at 872 (presuming that the reluctance to enforce
indefinite contracts stems from fear of judicial error in figuring out which exchange will
enhance the parties’ utility levels). See also supra note 42 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1581, 1588–89 (2005).
47. See, e.g., Elizabeth Mertz, An Afterword: Tapping the Promise of Relational Contract Theory—“Real” Legal Language and a New Legal Realism, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 909, 926 (2000)
NOMICS AND THE
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Others highlight that contracting parties, like courts, suffer from
bounded rationality and are susceptible to mistakes.48 Still other
scholars point out that the costs of enforcing seemingly complete
contracts are not necessarily lower than for ambiguous ones.49 Finally, recent scholarship argues that the risk of high litigation costs
may actually have a positive impact on the contractual stage.50
More important for this Article’s purposes is that, even if ambiguous contracts entail higher costs when litigation actually takes place,
no evidence supports a correlation between the level of ambiguity
in a contract and the prospects of such litigation. In fact, the analysis in this Part demonstrates that a certain level of ambiguity can
actually improve the contract’s durability over time and increase
the robustness of the transaction, which, in turn, may decrease the
prospects of litigation.51
This last observation calls, again, for a structured examination of
the virtues of ambiguity. Part II.A is dedicated to such inquiry. The
analysis deviates from a “one size fits all” approach and identifies
specific transaction attributes and circumstances where ex ante ambiguity may be particularly valuable. Part II.B highlights and
summarizes the connection between particular transaction attributes and constructive ambiguity, based on the insights that emerge
from Part II.A.52
(observing that judges spend their days unraveling contractual disputes and have information from both parties, as well as knowledge about the contract relationship). Cf. Schwartz,
supra note 7, at 281 (acknowledging that in many cases, courts will have verifiable information, based on which they can complete contracts with efficient terms).
48. See, e.g., Eggleston et al., supra note 44, at 123 (doubting the assumptions of “smart
parties” and “dumb courts” and observing that the parties themselves are susceptible to
bounded rationality and are prone to error). See also infra note 58 and associated text.
49. Jean Tirole, Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?, 67 ECONOMETRICA 741, 743–44
(1999) (referring to enforcement costs, while arguing that “[c]ourts must understand the
terms of the contract and verify the contracted upon contingencies and actions in order to
enforce the contract”). See also Gergen, supra note 6, at 1006 (stating that “open terms are
used because of the difficulty of writing and enforcing contracts that precisely specify performance subject to finely drawn conditions to deal with many known risks”) (emphasis added).
Likewise, the effort to avoid ambiguity may lead to drafting that is detailed and complex and
result in increased costs on the part of courts enforcing the agreement. Cf. Eggleston et al.,
supra note 44, at 99 (highlighting that understanding contracts creates a “cognitive overload”). In addition, the costs of monitoring a detailed contingent contract may be higher
than those associated with a more ambiguous contract that uses open terms and leaves more
discretion to the parties.
50. Choi & Triantis, supra note 3, at 859 (maintaining that high litigation costs facilitate
the signaling of private information at the time of contracting and re-negotiation, and operate as a screen on the seller’s decision to sue).
51. See infra Parts II.A.4 and II.A.5.
52. For the insight that transaction attributes may affect interpretive preferences, see,
Badawi, supra note 3, at 5 (arguing that the desirability of an interpretive regime depends on
the attributes of the underlying transaction).
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A. The Virtues of Ambiguity
The following analysis of ambiguity’s virtues focuses on economic
efficiency. It draws on existing legal and economic literature, as well
as on new interdisciplinary research. The former generally regards
ambiguity as “a necessary evil,” required for reducing ex ante transaction costs. The latter, however, highlights ambiguity’s intrinsic
value and the positive impact it may have on contract quality and
the parties’ relationship throughout the transaction.

1. Reducing Transaction Costs
As a preface to any discussion of ambiguity’s virtues, one must
acknowledge that, to a certain degree, ambiguity is not a choice but
a necessity. In other words, “all contracts are incomplete.”53 Social
and economic environments are fraught with embedded unpredictability.54 Parties to a contract simply cannot foresee all possible
contingencies, nor can they predict each contingency’s probability
of occurrence or its full impact on their relationship.55 Even if the
parties could identify the contingencies in advance, they still might
find it impossible to adequately predict and define ex ante the adequate responses.56 Language’s inherent limitations57 and the
concept of bounded rationality (i.e., “the limits of human capacity
53. Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1641, 1641 (2003) (emphasis added) (further explaining that “[t]here are infinite states of
the world and the capacities of contracting parties to condition their future performance on
each possible state are finite”). See also Lipshaw, supra note 3, at 1010–11 (arguing that contract documentation is “an imperfect exercise at best”).
54. NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, ANTIFRAGILE—THINGS THAT GAIN FROM DISORDER 137
(2012) (discussing the inherently limited predictability in social, economic and cultural life,
and describing these systems as “[lying] in the Black Swan domain”).
55. See supra note 53. See also Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There is No Law of Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 805, 815 (2000) (“[P]arties to a contract are never capable of reducing
all of the important terms of their arrangement to well-defined obligations.”); Charles J.
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1981)
(noting that a complete contingent contract, which identifies all relevant risks and assigns
them optimally, may not be a feasible option for parties that enter into a continuing, highly
interactive contractual arrangement).
56. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 55, at 1091; Tirole, supra note 49, at 743 (observing that
“[p]arties cannot define ex ante the contingencies that may occur (or actions that may be
feasible) later on”).
57. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 7, at 280 (referring to the “inevitable limitations of
language” as one reason for contract incompleteness); Sanford Schane, Ambiguity and Misunderstanding in the Law, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 167, 192 (2002) (arguing that ambiguity and
vagueness are “built into the very structure of language”).
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to respond optimally to the external conditions of uncertainty and
complexity”)58 further support this insight.
A perfectly contingent contract, detailing each party’s obligations
and responses in all possible scenarios, is, therefore, very much an
illusion.59 Even assuming that drafting a complete contract were
feasible, the transaction costs would be extremely high.60 This background clarifies ambiguity’s most frequently acknowledged
advantage: its potential to reduce ex ante transaction costs during
contract negotiations.61 Drafting an ambiguous provision is generally less expensive than drafting a set of perfectly contingent
provisions. For example, referring to “industry standards” in a
software license to describe a licensor’s expected level of service is
less costly than negotiating and detailing the contents of all such
industry standards in an unambiguous manner.62
The level of unpredictability and the number of future contingencies increase the longer the contract is expected to endure.
Thus, ambiguity is a particularly important tool for reducing transaction costs in long-term contracts.63 Similarly, when transactions
are executed in highly uncertain and complex environments, predicting and addressing all possible scenarios at the bargaining stage
is improbable,64 and parties may utilize ambiguous language as an
58. Goetz & Scott, supra note 55, at 1090 n.4 (discussing the concept of bounded rationality in the context of contract incompleteness). For a general account of bounded
rationality, see, for example, Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect
Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
59.

FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, at 480.

60. See, e.g., Tirole, supra note 49, at 743 (1999) (“Even if one could foresee all contingencies, they might be so numerous that it would be too costly to describe them in a
contract.”).
61. See, e.g., id.; Gergen, supra note 6, at 1006 (noting that the use of “open terms”
reduces the cost of contracting); Schwartz, supra note 7, at 278–79 (arguing that even when
parties are aware of certain contingencies, they may decide to not address them in their
contract, if such contingencies are sufficiently remote or the costs of addressing them are
sufficiently great).
62. See, e.g., Hon et al., supra note 15, at 92–125 (for relevant examples from IP licenses).
63. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law under Conditions of Radical Judicial
Error, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 749, 751 (2000) (observing that “long term events are so hard to
predict, that parties will not be able to allocate future obligations and payments in a way that
maximizes the value of their contract”); Kirsimarja Blomqvist, Pia Hurmelinna & Risto Seppänen, Playing the Collaboration Game Right—Balancing Trust and Contracting, 25
TECHNOVATION 497, 499 (2005) (citing IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (1980))
(noting that “long-term contracts are usually incomplete because of the uncertainties that
arise given the longer period of time during which there might be more changes”).
64. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 55, at 1090 n.4 (noting that under conditions of uncertainty and complexity it becomes extremely costly for the contracting parties to describe the
complete decision tree).
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efficient solution. This observation is particularly valid for provisions addressing low-probability occurrences, remote scenarios, or
matters that are not considered ex ante high-risk.65 In such circumstances, the expected costs of further negotiating such provisions
may well outweigh the expected benefits.66

2. “Getting the Deal Done”
A related point in the cost-benefit analysis maintains that, in
many cases, closing the transaction may actually require a certain
degree of ambiguity.67 If the parties insist on addressing every potential contingency in a completely detailed fashion, then,
naturally, more opportunities for disputes and bargaining failures
will arise and the contract may not be executed at all. This is especially true when the negotiation is conducted in a competitive
market environment where timing is often crucial, alternative deals
are imminent, and “contract perfectionism” may be detrimental. If
the parties fail to agree on a material provision, the costs of losing
the deal are a necessary evil. Yet, where the relevant provision is
peripheral in nature, a negotiation breakdown may not be an efficient result. To quote Richard Posner: “Deliberate ambiguity may
be a necessary condition of making the contract; the parties may be
unable to agree on certain points yet be content to take their
chances on being able to resolve them, with or without judicial intervention, should the need arise.”68

65. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 278–79 (explaining that some “contingencies may seem
[to the parties] sufficiently remote or the costs of dealing with them sufficiently great as to
make neglect the best response.“).
66. See Gergen, supra note 6, at 1062 (noting that the savings in transaction costs may
outweigh expected enforcement costs). See also Schwartz, supra note 7, at 278 (observing that
the “costs of solving the problem may exceed the parties’ private gain from a solution.”). In
addition, imperfect monitoring of detailed and unambiguous contract provisions may decrease the expected benefits of having such provisions in place.
67. See Lipshaw, supra note 3, at 1009 (maintaining that parties often use open terms
and “negotiated ambiguities” in order to have a contract that will close the deal); Duhl, supra
note 3, at 78 (noting that drafting a contract with inconsistent provisions is sometimes a
technique employed by lawyers so as to “get a deal done”). While Duhl focuses on lawyers,
this practice may well reflect the instructions of sophisticated clients, who often guide their
attorneys to compromise drafting and “close the deal,” unless there is a major disagreement
over material terms.
68. Posner, supra note 46, at 1583.
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3. Ambiguity and Relational Contracts
The foregoing cost-benefit efficiency analysis may apply with particular force to relational contracts, where parties are often able to
resolve disputes without recourse to the legal system.69 While there
is no uniform definition of a “relational contract,”70 certain characteristics are often associated with these agreements:71 a long
contractual relationship extending over time, unlike a “spot” market deal;72 the parties’ difficulty in precisely defining their
arrangement;73 and the “interdependence of the parties to the exchange,” which extends “beyond the single discrete transaction to a
range of social interrelationships”74 so that such contracts involve
“not merely an exchange, but also a relationship.”75 Admittedly,
every contract is, to some extent, a relational contract.76 Yet, even if
contracts cannot be classified in a binary manner as relational or
non-relational, they are measurable across a continuum between
the discrete and relational ends.77
69. For the concept of relational contracts, see the seminal works of Stewart Macaulay,
Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963) (observing that parties engaged in business relations often abstain from complete planning of their
exchange relationship and seldom use legal sanctions to settle disputes); Macneil, supra note
23, at 870 (referring to the perceptions of contracts as relations rather than as discrete transactions, while coining the term “relational contracts”).
70. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 55, at 816 (referring to the numerous efforts to define
relational contracts).
71. See, e.g., Speidel, supra note 35, 823–24 (arguing that relational contracts have at
least three distinguishing characteristics: extended duration, incompleteness, and the existence of a “relationship” between the parties).
72. See, e.g., id.; see also Schwartz, supra note 7, at 271 n.1 (referring to relational contracts’ longevity); Goetz & Scott, supra note 55, at 1091 (discussing the tendency to equate
“relational contracts” with long-term contractual involvements).
73. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 55, at 1091 (arguing that “[a] contract is relational
to the extent that the parties are incapable of reducing important terms of the arrangement
to well-defined obligations”); Speidel, supra note 35, at 823 (noting that in relational contracts, “parts of the exchange cannot be easily measured or precisely defined at the time of
contracting”).
74. See, e.g., Lewis Kornhauser, Book Review: The Resurrection of Contract, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
184, 190 (1982) (citing IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (1980)); see also Speidel,
supra note 35, at 825 (observing that in relational contracts, the transaction is embedded in a
social or economic context); Gergen, supra note 6, at 999 (explaining that relational contracts are usually “long-term relationships that depend on the parties’ continued
cooperation”); Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 737,
748 (2000) (noting that the term “emphasizes the interdependence of individuals in social
and economic relationships”).
75. Eisenberg, supra note 55, at 816.
76. See, e.g., Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 NW. U. L. REV.
340, 341–42 (1983) (admitting that “all contracts are relational”).
77. See, e.g., Macneil, supra note 23, at 865 (addressing the discrete-relational spectrum);
Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 877, 894
(2000) (similarly discussing the discrete-relational spectrum); Eisenberg, supra note 55, at
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Literature analyzing relational contracts has grappled with their
various implications.78 Most important for this Article are observations concerning parties’ increased ability to resolve disputes
without recourse to legal sanctions.79 The factors that contribute to
the parties’ ability to “iron out” conflicts include the existence of
non-legal sanctions resulting from widely accepted norms,80 the
evolution of personal and business relations across organizational
boundaries,81 the parties’ mutual dependence on the success of
their ongoing relationship combined with enhanced costs of termination,82 and their desire to successfully continue in business and
avoid conduct that might hurt their reputation.83 All in all, the
longer and more interdependent the parties’ relations and the
stronger and more cooperative their relationship becomes over
time, the greater the chances that the parties can amicably resolve
disputes arising in the contractual stage.84
When complementary governance modes, cooperation, and selfenforcement mechanisms are available, the prospect of litigation
decreases. Where this is the case, the importance of unambiguous
813 (citing IAN R. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS: EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS 12–13 (2d.
ed. 1978)) (“[A] contract is characterized as lying at the discrete end of the spectrum if it has
less of certain characteristics—for example, less duration, less personal interaction, less future cooperative burdens, less in the way of units of exchange that are difficult to measure—
and as lying at the relational end of the spectrum if it has more of the relevant
characteristics.”).
78. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 63, at 749 (indicating that according to the relational
contracts strand of scholarship, contracts should be “analyzed as elements of relationships”);
see also Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 483,
502 (1985) (arguing that “we cannot even understand a promise outside its relational
context”).
79. See, most prominently, Macaulay, supra note 69, at 60–62.
80. Id. at 63 (discussing the norms that “[c]ommitments are to be honored” and that
one should “stand behind” one’s product).
81. Id. (noting the effect of “personal relationships across the boundaries of the two
organizations”). See also Blomqvist et al., supra note 63, at 499 (indicating that when complementary governance modes such as trust exist, contracts are less important).
82. See generally, Goetz & Scott, supra note 55, at 1092 (discussing the interdependency
that characterizes relational contracts). See also Speidel, supra note 35, at 830 (referring to
the costs of termination that are often enhanced in such contracts).
83. Macaulay, supra note 69, at 63. See also Gergen, supra note 6, at 1008 (referring to
reputation as an important factor for self-enforcement of contracts). Cf. Thomas M. Palay,
Comparative Institutional Economics: The Governance of Freight Contracting, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 265,
275–76 (1984) (indicating that preserving the relationship and parties’ reputations are the
most cited constraints on opportunism where contracts are not legally enforceable); TALEB,
supra note 54, at 17 (observing that commerce is “the door to tolerance” as mistakes are
“small and easily forgotten”).
84. See also infra Part II.A.5 for a discussion of the effect of ambiguity on trust. Cf. Macaulay, supra note 69, at 61–63 (indicating that when the relationship is ongoing, parties may not
even refer to the written instrument in their attempt to settle a dispute); Blomqvist et al.,
supra note 63, at 498–99 (discussing the potential destructive effect that referring to the
contract may have on the level of trust between the parties).
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ex ante drafting of each and every contingency decreases. This is
especially true where the relevant contingency refers to the non-immediate future, as the parties’ relationship develops over time, which
may enhance their problem-solving capacities.85 In such circumstances, having a “perfect” contract in place is less important, and
the potential costs of ambiguity may be much lower than initially
apparent. Thus, a certain degree of ambiguity may be particularly
efficient in relational contracts.

4. Ambiguity, Robustness, and Anti-Fragility
The discussion has so far presented ambiguity as a “necessary
evil” that should be reluctantly tolerated as part of the cost-benefit
tradeoff between ex ante negotiation costs and ex post enforcement
costs. In the following paragraphs, the analysis goes a step further.
It demonstrates that in some cases, a certain degree of ambiguity
may actually enhance contract quality and transaction resilience
and, hence, can have an intrinsic value in contract design.
Most notably, ambiguity may serve to maintain a certain degree
of flexibility during the transaction’s life. Given the volatility, uncertainty, and unpredictability inherent in commercial
environments,86 such flexibility may be crucial in allowing the transaction to endure unforeseen developments and future crises.87 This
may be particularly important for contracts of relatively long duration, especially when the market is highly dynamic and uncertain.88
85. In addition, the distant future is more unpredictable, which increases the costs of
detailed drafting. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
86. TALEB, supra note 54, at 57 (discussing the unpredictability of complex systems and
referring to uncertainty, variability, imperfect knowledge, chance, randomness, chaos, volatility, and various other disorder phenomena embedded in such systems).
87. While scholars have discussed the need to maintain flexibility in the post-contractual
stage, the role of ambiguity in that context has not been sufficiently explored. For specific
arguments in this context, see D. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 902, 903 (1998) (arguing that if some aspects
of performance in a dynamic contract must be incomplete due to transaction costs or limits
on verifiability, then parties may desire to leave certain aspects of the other party’s performance unspecified also, in order to leave room for the second party to influence the first
party’s choices); Chou et al., supra note 27, at 6 (noting that a complete contract imposes
constraints that can reduce the parties’ future action options).
88. Cf. Macneil, supra note 23, at 865–73, 900 (discussing a range of techniques parties
use in long term contracts to enhance flexibility, including the use of external standards such
as Consumer Price Index, third-party determination of performance, one-party control of
terms, and an agreement to agree; and arguing that relational contracts, “being more complex and of greater duration than discrete transactions, become dysfunctional if too rigid . . .”)
(emphasis added).
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Thus, for instance, a “best efforts” clause allows more flexibility
and “breathing space” than a provision listing performance obligations in an unambiguous manner.89 The latter may fail to serve its
purpose should unpredictable changes in commercial circumstances or the relevant markets occur during the contractual term.
In other words, explicit drafting may be too rigid in the face of
unpredictable future developments. More ambiguous drafting, on
the other hand, may continue to serve as the governing framework
for the contractual relationship even in the face of changing
circumstances.90
By providing potentially plausible arguments for both parties if a
certain contingency becomes relevant,91 ambiguity may encourage
creative solutions to the challenges arising throughout the lifetime
of the contract, which allow the parties to reach more specific consents as reality unfolds. To illustrate, parties to a license for the
development and marketing of a new pharmaceutical product may
be unable to accurately anticipate its future launch date (which may
occur years after contract execution) due to uncertainties surrounding development, clinical trials, or regulatory approvals.
Using ambiguous language, such as “the earliest commercially reasonable date,” may serve the transaction better than detailing the
almost endless potential scenarios and setting a definitive and unambiguous date for each.92 Thus, provisions that are more
ambiguous and less rigid increase the contract’s adaptability.
Nassim Taleb’s recent work on anti-fragility reinforces these observations and sheds further light on ambiguity’s contribution to
commercial transactions.93 Literature in the complexity field highlights the unpredictability and opacity inherent in complex

89. For the use of “best efforts” and other open terms, see supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.
90. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 317 (noting that “when parties cannot create terms to
govern all possible contingencies, they sometimes can create ‘structures’ that channel their
responses to these contingencies in desirable ways”) (emphasis added).
91. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
92. For the use of such language in an IP license, see supra note 16 and accompanying
text.
93. TALEB, supra note 54, at 3–4, 137. Taleb coined the term “anti-fragility,” which refers
to the ability to adapt and benefit from uncertainty, unpredictability and disorder.
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economic and social systems.94 Such properties make “perfect planning” epistemologically impossible.95 Based on these observations,
Taleb points out that, rather than trying to anticipate and regulate
the unpredictable, players in complex systems should concentrate
on increasing their capacity to adjust to and even benefit from unforeseen events.96 To this end, simplicity and rules of thumb may be
preferable to ultra-sophisticated and detailed planning.97 Moreover,
systems that are accustomed to handling a degree of volatility and
even confusion are more adaptable and anti-fragile than those that
try to avoid it at all costs.98
Although Taleb’s work does not address contract drafting, his insights are very relevant to this Article’s argument. As the discussion
above demonstrates, ambiguous contractual language can increase
the players’ capacity to respond to uncertainty and volatility, which
improves the contract’s resilience and anti-fragility. Thus, transactions governed by somewhat ambiguous provisions may survive
where contracts that adhere to the ideal of perfect planning and
“zero ambiguity” may fail.

5. Ambiguity and Inducing Trust
Finally, maintaining a level of ambiguity may foster trust between
parties during negotiation, and, as a result, facilitate their cooperation in the contractual stage. The process of contract design and
formation impacts the parties’ perceptions of one another and
their future relationship, thus influencing their level of collaboration during the contract’s life. Throughout the negotiation stage, a
party’s behavior “can signal the extent to which it trusts the other
94. Complexity is an interdisciplinary field dedicated to the research of complex systems
that are comprised of multiple interacting components, including, for example, not only
social and economic systems but also natural and biological systems. See generally MELANIE
MITCHELL, COMPLEXITY—A GUIDED TOUR (2009). For the unpredictability of complex systems, see, for example, TALEB, supra note 54, at 57–58 (explaining that due to the
interdependencies among the multiple components comprising complex systems, causal relations in such systems are nonlinear and cannot be isolated). See also MITCHELL, supra, at 20
(explaining that understanding chaos and complex systems’ dynamics laid to rest the hopes
for perfect prediction); DUNCAN J. WATTS, EVERYTHING IS OBVIOUS* ONCE YOU KNOW THE
ANSWER 148, 162, 171 (2011) (discussing the limits of accurate prediction of the behavior of
complex systems).
95. TALEB, supra note 54, at 284 (referring to the “planning fallacy”).
96. Id. at 234–35.
97. Id. at 305 (discussing the advantages of “less-is-more”).
98. Id. at 101 (indicating that when players are unused to volatility, the slightest change
will disturb the system, and that “injecting some confusion” has a stabilizing impact in the
system).
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party.”99 Parties may construe insistence upon contract completeness as lack of trust, which in turn may negatively impact the
dynamics of the negotiations.100
A recent empirical study in the field of business management
supports the notion that ambiguity preserves trust. The study documents how attempts to create more complete contracts—by adding
more details or clauses—can “crowd out rapport and undermine
trust and cooperation.”101 The findings indicate that contract completeness may signal distrust, convey a less personal view of the
relationship, and reduce the parties’ relational expectations.102 Furthermore, the effect appears to carry over into the post-negotiation
stage and negatively impact the parties’ cooperative behavior
throughout the transaction.103 These findings imply that the “trust
effect” is more significant when ongoing interpersonal relations between the parties are vital for the success of the transaction.
Researchers further suggest that revising this negative “first impression” during the contractual phase may be difficult.104
Further research is needed to measure this impact in actual (as
opposed to experimental) business settings.105 Yet, assuming that a
certain level of negative correlation exists between contract completeness and the level of trust between the parties, this effect can
have significant implications. Trust is a key factor in many types of
99. Barondes, supra note 4, at 46.
100. Cf. Eggleston et al., supra note 44, at 117–18 (indicating that parties may elect to
keep the terms of their contract simple in order to signal that they are trustworthy and that
“adding language” may alert the other party to “bad outcomes”). For a more general argument regarding the potential negative effect of “legalizing” a commercial relationship, see
Macaulay, supra note 69, at 64 (indicating that the use of contracts and contract law may have
undesirable consequences and “carefully planned arrangements may create undesirable exchange relationships between business units”). Cf. Blomqvist et al., supra note 63, at 498
(noting that parties to a contract often avoid referring to the written instrument out of concern that it “may result in a breakdown of trust and thus put the success of the collaboration
at risk”).
101. Chou et al., supra note 27, at 4–5. As a measurement of contract completeness, the
study uses the specificity of the language and the number of clauses in the contract. Id.
102. See id. at 20–21.
103. Id. at 19 (finding that increasing the number of contract clauses reduces the actual
cooperative behavior of the participants).
104. Id. at 6–7 (arguing that because people have difficulty ignoring information once
they have acquired it, discounting or revising signals of mistrust at a later stage can be particularly difficult).
105. One may argue that in the context of a true business relationship, insistence on
details should not have such a strong signaling effect as it merely reflects a reasonable desire
to minimize risk at the initial stage of the relationship. Furthermore, parties to business
transactions often have legal representation, and it is not clear to what extent exchanges
between lawyers throughout the contracting process may serve as signals of distrust and undermine cooperation between the parties themselves.

414

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 48:2

business transactions,106 and a minimum threshold of mutual trust
is crucial for the cooperation their success often requires.107 Beyond
its general importance for ongoing transactions, trust also plays a
particularly significant role in times of disagreement, where a baseline of mutual trust can facilitate dispute resolution.108
Furthermore, empirical work in the business management field indicates that higher levels of trust in a contractual relationship
increase the parties’ willingness to continue their affiliation after a
dispute arises.109
In sum, insisting on contract completeness during the negotiation phase can undermine the trust and collaboration required for
resolving disputes arising over the course of the contract term. Acquiescing to a certain degree of ambiguity, on the other hand, may
foster trust and prove beneficial for the parties’ transaction.
****
This Article’s analysis so far indicates that the ideal of a fully complete contract is not only unobtainable—it is also not socially
optimal. Instead, a certain level of ambiguity in contracts can have
various virtues: reducing transaction costs associated with foreseeing and negotiating remote contingencies, facilitating the closing
of efficient transactions, increasing the adaptability and anti-fragility of contracts in the face of unforeseen developments, and
preserving trust between the parties. Moreover, the costs of ambiguity may not be as great as first imagined, particularly in relational
contracts where the parties’ chances of resolving disputes without
recourse to litigation are higher.
Of course, reality does not always follow parties’ ex ante expectations and evaluations. Sometimes, remote scenarios materialize,
disputes over low probability occurrences arise, trust breaks, and
106. See, e.g., Blomqvist et al., supra note 63, at 498 (noting the critical role of trust as a
success factor in the context of asymmetric R&D partnerships); Macaulay, supra note 37, at
801 (referring to the role of trust in long-term continuing relations).
107. See, e.g., Blomqvist et al., supra note 63, at 502 (referring specifically to asymmetric
R&D partnerships and suggesting that “successful collaboration is possible only if there is a
cooperative threshold amount of trust between the parties”).
108. See also supra Part II.A.3 (for a discussion of relational contracts). The effectiveness
of self-enforcement mechanisms embedded in relational contracts seems to depend on the
existence of a minimal level of trust between the parties.
109. See generally Deepak Malhotra & Fabrice Lumineau, Trust and Collaboration in the Aftermath of Conflict: The Effects of Contract Structure, 54 ACAD. MGMT. J. 981 (2011). Malhotra and
Lumineau’s findings distinguish between goodwill and competence dimensions of trust, id. at
986, but the bottom line is that both aspects of trust positively correlate with the willingness
to continue a relationship after a dispute has arisen, id. at 990–91. The study also explores
how contract structure affects trust, but it does not measure the effect of contract completeness and is, therefore, less relevant for the purposes of this Article.
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parties to relational contracts end up in court. In such circumstances, the parties may wish that the suddenly-relevant, ambiguous
provisions were drafted in a clear and unequivocal manner.
Yet, such hindsight is misleading. Even if ambiguity’s ex post costs
outweigh its benefits in a particular case, in many other instances
low-probability occurrences will not materialize and ambiguous provisions will remain dormant. In still other cases, the parties may
resolve their differences without resorting to litigation. Thus, even
if a dispute arises ex post, the parties’ decision to employ ambiguity
when drafting their contract may still be rational.
Furthermore, from a general societal perspective, the aggregate
balance between the benefits and costs of employing a certain degree of ambiguity in contracts could still be positive. To incentivize
potential parties to behave in socially efficient and desirable ways as
they draft their agreements, the legal system should focus on the
negotiating stage. Therefore, the appropriate prism for any evaluation of ambiguity must be the parties’ ex ante perspective at the time
of contract formation. Thus, if ambiguity was warranted ex ante,
then the judicial response should tolerate it ex post.
More importantly, the foregoing systematic inquiry into ambiguity’s advantages and costs directs us away from a “one-size-fits-all”
solution. Instead, the analysis distills certain transaction traits that
positively correlate to ambiguity’s virtues. In other words, the benefits of ambiguity may be more pronounced and its costs lower in
agreements that possess certain properties. This insight has significant normative implications: if certain types of contracts that can
benefit more from ex ante ambiguity are identifiable, then courts
should treat ambiguous provisions in these transactions more liberally than in other types of transactions. The following Part
highlights the principal transaction attributes that emerge from the
above discussion.

B. Ambiguity and Particular Transaction Attributes
The analysis in Part II.A points towards three principal traits of a
transaction that make it more disposed to constructive ambiguity:
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1. A Longer Contract Term
Unpredictability increases with time.110 Therefore, the cost of
drafting a “complete” contract increases when the contract term is
longer and the parties must “see into the future” and address numerous contingencies.111 Furthermore, when the transaction’s
duration is longer, ambiguity is more significant for maintaining
the flexibility and adaptability vital for the contract’s robustness and
anti-fragility.112 In addition, parties to a longer-term contract are
more likely to form strong—and sometimes personal—relationships that might increase their ability to resolve disputes
amicably.113 This, in turn, reduces the prospects of litigation and,
with it, the potential costs of ambiguity.114

2. Relational Features
Ambiguity can be particularly beneficial in transactions that exhibit relational features, such as mutual dependence, ongoing
cooperation, and the existence of personal relationships across organizational boundaries.115 As explained above, the costs of
ambiguity in relational contracts are likely lower, due to parties’ increased ability to resolve disputes without litigation.116
Furthermore, the “trust effect”—i.e., the possible effect of contract
completeness on undermining trust between the parties (and vice
versa)—is possibly greater when the relationship between the parties is more interpersonal.117

3. Uncertainty and Complexity of the Transaction
and the Relevant Markets
The transaction costs of unambiguous drafting may be especially
great in complex or highly dynamic business environments due to
110. See TALEB, supra note 54, at 13 (“more time, more events, more disorder”).
111. See, e.g., Blomqvist et al., supra note 63, at 499 (“long-term contracts are usually incomplete because of the uncertainties that arise given the longer period of time during
which there might be more changes”). See also supra note 63 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 86–92 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 74, 84 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 74, 84 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 74–75 80–83 and accompanying text.
116. See generally supra Part II.A.3.
117. See generally supra Part II.A.5 and particularly the references supra notes 101–104.
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lower predictability.118 Moreover, as indicated above, when parties
operate in highly dynamic markets, flexibility and adaptability are
particularly crucial, and ambiguity can be an important tool for
maintaining the robustness and anti-fragility of their transaction.119
****
Notably, even when all of the above features exist in a certain
transaction, this Article’s analysis does not imply that ambiguity
should be completely embraced and clarity always rejected. Yet, altogether, the more dominant these three traits are in a transaction,
it is more likely that the benefits of a certain degree of ambiguity
will be greater and its costs lower.
Part III looks more closely at this proposition by examining IP
license agreements. It highlights the prevalence of the three features identified above in IP license agreements and the beneficial
role ambiguity can play in those transactions.

III. IP LICENSES

AS A

CASE STUDY

In many respects, the interaction of intellectual property licenses
and contract theory has been under-studied. Academic examination of IP licenses usually scrutinizes these agreements through the
prism of IP law and theory with occasional assistance from other
branches such as antitrust law.120 Although scholars have analyzed
certain contractual aspects of license transactions—especially modern contractual arrangements like shrink-wrap, click-wrap, and
118. See generally supra Part II.A.1 and particularly supra note 64 and accompanying text.
119. See generally supra Part II.A.4 and particularly the references supra note 88. Cf. Eggleston et al., supra note 44, at 131 (maintaining that complexity of the environment may be a
reason for liberal interpretation of contracts).
120. Examples of matters scholarship frequently discusses include: the enforceability of
license terms that impose restrictions on the use of IP protected subject matter which are
broader than those set out in IP law, see, e.g., Maureen A. O’Rourke, Drawing the Boundary
Between Copyright and Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479
(1995) (exploring whether parties to a license can contract around copyright law’s fair use
exception); the evaluation of certain licensing practices under the copyright misuse or patent
misuse doctrines or under antitrust law, see, e.g., Michael J. Meurer, Vertical Restraints and
Intellectual Property Law: Beyond Antitrust, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1871 (2003) (comparing the effectiveness of IP law and antitrust law in regulating vertical restraints); and the prospects of
concluding voluntary license transactions in various circumstances, see, e.g., Mark A. Lemley,
The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997) (exploring
licensing negotiations in the context of cumulative innovation).
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browse-wrap licenses121—the analysis of IP licenses from the perspective of contract law and theory has been largely overlooked.
Yet, as contractual instruments, IP licenses are subject to contract
law rules and doctrines, including those regarding ambiguity.122
Part I established that various types of ambiguities exist in IP license agreements.123 This Part examines the suitability of these
agreements for “constructive ambiguity.” In a nutshell, the analysis
indicates that IP license transactions commonly display the three
features identified above as “ambiguity-friendly” characteristics.
Moreover, these three characteristics are tightly related to the
unique nature of IP rights and markets. Hence, IP licenses negotiated between sophisticated parties constitute paradigmatic cases for
constructive ambiguity. The following Subparts explore this proposition and delve deeply into the relevant traits of IP licenses.

A. Long Duration
IP licenses regularly cover the licensee’s long-term, ongoing use
of the licensed subject matter.124 Unlike transactions to transfer or
assign ownership in intellectual property rights, where the IP owner
divests itself of rights in the subject matter, in a license transaction
121. These types of agreements are predominantly used in the software industry. The
term “shrink-wrap” license describes a license placed inside the plastic wrapping of a software
product, to which customers bind themselves when they open and use the software. In a
“click-wrap” license, a notice of the terms and conditions is typically provided in a pop-up
text box, which requires users to assent to the agreement by clicking on an icon. Finally, the
term “browse-wrap” typically refers to terms and conditions posted on a website that does not
even require the user to expressly manifest assent. See, e.g., Tarra Zynda, Ticketmaster Corp.
v. Tickets.com, Inc.: Preserving Minimum Requirements of Contract on the Internet, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 495, 500–04 (2004). Such contractual arrangements challenge traditional doctrines of contract law, and have been the subject of significant academic discussion. See
generally, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459 (2006) (discussing the
growing judicial willingness to enforce electronic contracts); Zynda, supra (proposing a validity analysis for online contracts); Nathan J. Davis, Presumed Assent: The Judicial Acceptance of
Clickwrap, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 (2007) (maintaining that the current framework for
adjudicating click-wrap licensing is effective).
122. See generally RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND OTHER
INFORMATION ASSETS 3 (2004) (stating that a “license is a contract”); HAROLD EINHORN & ERIC
E. BENSEN, PATENT LICENSING TRANSACTIONS 1–4 (updated through October 2013) (noting
that “a license is merely a form of a contract”).
123. See supra Part I.A.
124. Commentators often describe the essence of an IP license as the licensor’s undertaking not to sue the licensee for a conduct that would otherwise constitute an infringement of
intellectual property rights. See, e.g., MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., PATENT LAW, 1231 (1998);
RAYMOND T. NIMMER & JEFF C. DODD, MODERN LICENSING LAW 74 (2007–08). See also G.
GERVAISE DAVIS III, SOFTWARE PROTECTION 187 (1985) (defining a license as “the grant of a
right by the ‘licensor’ to a ‘licensee’ to do something that the licensee could not do without
the permission of the licensor”).
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the IP owner generally retains ownership of the rights during the
transaction’s life.125 Thus, the performance stage of a license transaction is normally continuous and the contractual relationship
between the parties lasts over a period of time specified in the license.126 The non-rival nature of intellectual property, which
accounts for the licensor’s power to simultaneously license the
rights to multiple parties,127 and the long duration of intellectual
property rights make licensing a common business model for the
commercial exploitation of IP assets.128
In practice, licenses are often granted for lengthy periods. For
example, software licenses in the business-to-business segment typically set out an initial term of one year, subject to optional or
automatic renewals.129 Frequently, the initial use of a software program creates a lock-in effect,130 which results in multiple renewals
and longer license duration. Broadcasting rights agreements are
another example: their term depends on the nature of the licensed
content and can vary from several months (as in the case of a single
program) to several years (as in the case of a complete channel).131
Similarly, licenses for development and commercialization in the
125. See, e.g., NIMMER, supra note 122, at 3; DAVIS, supra note 124, at 196 (explaining that
once a copyright assignment is made, the original rights holder no longer has any rights to
the copyright).
126. See generally NIMMER, supra note 122, at 483–521 (discussing duration of licenses).
127. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1580 (2003); Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 13–14 (2005); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1610–11 (1982); Peter
S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1337 (1987)
(discussing the non-rival nature of intellectual property assets).
128. See, e.g., NIMMER, supra note 122, at 3 (maintaining that “today, licensing is a significant aspect of virtually all areas of commerce that deal with information or information
services”); DAVIS, supra note 124, at 194–95 (explaining why software is regularly licensed and
not sold).
129. See, e.g., Hon et al., supra note 15, at 120 (presenting empirical research indicating
that initial contract terms cloud service providers propose as a basis for negotiation “typically
stipulate a one to three-year initial term, sometimes renewing automatically unless
terminated”).
130. Indeed, the seminal work of Katz and Shapiro, which discussed network externalities
and lock-in, focused on technology adoption. Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities, 94 J. POL. ECON. 822, 823–24 (1986). For literature
discussing the lock-in effect in the software industry, see, for example, CARL SHAPIRO & HAL
VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 11–13, 160
(1999); Mark Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 506, 522 (1998); Aaron S. Edline & Robert G. Harris, The Role of Switching
Costs in Antitrust Analysis: A Comparison of Microsoft and Google, 15 YALE J. L. & TECH. 169,
178–79 (2012).
131. See, e.g., César Mattos, Broadcasting Football Rights in Brazil: The Case of Globo and “Club
of 13” in the Antitrust Perspective, 42(2) EST. ECON. 337, 343, 357 (2012) (discussing the various
durations of sports broadcasting rights agreements).
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pharmaceutical field must account for the extensive time and effort
conducting clinical trials and acquiring regulatory approvals entails.
The initial term of such licenses can easily exceed ten years.132 Likewise, trademark licenses are often part of franchising or other
ventures that necessitate substantial and ongoing investment on
part of the licensee.133 Their term can reach ten or even twenty
years.134
As explained in Part II, such long contractual terms increase the
costs of “predicting the future” and avoiding ambiguity. In addition, the prospects of amicable dispute resolution may be greater
and the benefits to the transaction’s adaptability and anti-fragility
more pronounced.135

B. Relational Features
Beyond their typically long duration, IP licenses often exhibit
strong relational features. Such features are also related to IP’s
unique traits. Knowledge and information are the basis of most IP
assets, and layers of knowhow, expertise, and tacit knowledge regularly surround formal IP rights.136 For example, despite patent
applicants’ duty to adequately disclose relevant technologies in patent applications,137 the technologies disclosed are often
132. See Christian Bessy & Eric Brousseau, Technology Licensing Contracts Features and Diversity, 18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 451, 456 (1998) (presenting empirical evidence showing that
approximately sixty-five percent of the technology licenses examined specified a term exceeding seven years); Philip Mendes, Licensing and Technology Transfer in the Pharmaceutical
Industry, 20, available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/sme/en/documents/pdf/
pharma_licensing.pdf (maintaining that the term of a pharmaceutical license is typically until the expiry of the last patent).
133. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete
Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927–28 (1990) (noting that “franchisees often make very large
sunk investments in their franchises”).
134. Cf. id. at 937 (presenting an empirical research that demonstrates the prevalence of
long-term franchise agreements for specified terms of ten years, twenty years or even more).
135. See supra Part II.B.1.
136. For the concept of tacit knowledge, see generally MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1958). For literature discussing tacit
knowledge in the context of IP rights, see, for example, Margareth Chon, Sticky Knowledge and
Copyright, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 177 (2011) (maintaining that copyright often does not protect
“tacit knowledge” surrounding the copyright subject matter); Eric von Hippel, “Sticky Information” and the Locus of Problem Solving: Implications for Innovation, 40 MGMT. SCI. 429 (1994)
(maintaining that technological problem solving often involves “sticky information”).
137. Under the Patent Act, the inventor must adequately disclose three separate elements: (1) the invention (the “description” requirement), (2) the manner and process of
making and using the invention (the “enablement” requirement), and (3) the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention (the “best mode” requirement).
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 7–9 (2010).
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accompanied by trade secrets that are not easily accessible without
the IP owner’s cooperation.138 At times, only certain components of
a system are patented, while other parts are maintained as trade
secrets.139 Sharing such knowhow with the licensee is often crucial
in order for the licensee to utilize the relevant technology. At the
same time, transferring tacit knowledge may be quite
complicated.140
Therefore, beyond formally licensing an intellectual property
right, the parties often need to cooperate in order to allow the licensee to access the licensor’s know-how, expertise, and tacit
information.141 Indeed, IP licenses frequently provide ongoing obligations to cooperate. For example, in agreements for the
development of pharmaceuticals or medical devices, the licensors
of core technologies must typically assist their licensees in the development stage and in securing regulatory approvals.142 Likewise,
licensors of television programs frequently assist their licensees in
adapting the content of programs to suit local audiences.143
138. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1029 n.52 (1989) (referring to patent applicants’
practice of withholding information from patent specifications and protecting their knowhow through trade secrecy); Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1584 (2002) (acknowledging that “a patent does
not teach technologists everything they might want to know”). Patent law’s disclosure requirements instruct the inventor to disclose information she might otherwise preserve as a
trade secret. See, e.g., DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 7-616 (2010). However, trade
secrets may cover information that does not fall within the scope of such requirements. R2
Med. Sys., Inc. v. Katecho, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 1397, 1420 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
139. See, e.g., Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 138, at 1620 (discussing the practice of
platform developers to patent some components of their systems while maintaining Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) as trade secrets).
140. See supra note 136. See also Ashish Arora, Contracting for Tacit Knowledge: The Provision
of Technical Services in Technology Licensing Contracts, 50 J. DEV. ECON. 233 (1996) (discussing
the difficulties of transferring know-how in light of the prevalence of tacit knowledge).
141. See generally FRANÇOIS DESSEMONTET, THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF KNOW-HOW IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 55 (2d ed., 1976) (discussing the “auxiliary function” of knowhow in connection with technology transfer agreements); EINHORN & BENSEN, supra note 122,
at 1-86.13 (noting that “[p]atent license agreements often include a license to trade secrets
related to the patented technology and/or know-how related to the implementation of the
patented technology”).
142. See Hugh B. Wellons, Eileen Smith Ewing, Robert Copple, William Wofford & Erika
Leitzan, Biotechnology and the Law 172 (1st ed. 2007) (emphasizing the importance of cooperation in licensing nascent technologies in the biotech field).
143. See ALBERT MORAN & JUSTIN MABON, UNDERSTANDING THE GLOBAL TV FORMAT 59
(2006) (discussing the need to receive producers’ consultation when adapting television formats); Michael Keane, East Asia, The Global Regional Dynamic, in CULTURES AND
GLOBALIZATION: THE CULTURAL ECONOMY 141, 144 (Helmut K. Anheier & Yudhishthir Raj
Isar eds., 2008) (indicating that when television formats are licensed, consultancy and expertise are a valued commodity).
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Software licensors, similarly, are regularly obliged to provide on-going support and maintenance services, as well as training, knowhow, and other types of assistance to enable licensees to use the
technology properly and capture its full benefits.144
In such circumstances, parties to license transactions frequently
need to share confidential information. This information may consist of the expertise and tacit knowledge related to the licensed
technology or may pertain to the licensee’s clientele, financial data,
or business infrastructure.145 In some cases, transferring knowledge
and information requires granting the licensor access to the licensee’s premises and infrastructure,146 a measure that necessitates
significant cooperation and a substantial level of trust between the
parties.147
Moreover, tacit knowledge and expertise are usually held by specific individuals within organizations.148 Therefore, the personal
identity of the individuals involved in the performance of the contract is often highly important and specified in IP licenses.149
Agreements for the development of customized software solutions,
for example, often specify, in appended statements of work
(SOWs), the identity of the developer’s project manager and personnel, and afford the customer certain input if the individuals
need to be replaced.150 Biotech and pharmaceutical licenses may
contain similar provisions.151 Over time, such continuous personal
involvement facilitates the formation of personal relationships between the parties.
144. See, e.g., Greg R. Vetter, Exit and Voice in Free and Open Source Software Licensing: Moderating the Rein over Software Users, 85 OR. L. REV. 183, 203–04 n.80 (2006) (noting that most
software users purchase ongoing maintenance and support).
145. For example, in order to customize “off the shelf” technological products to the
special needs of a particular licensee, licensees must disclose to the licensor information
about licensee’s business and technological infrastructure.
146. This may be required, for example, in order to install a technological product or
provide maintenance and support services. See, e.g., Vetter, supra note 144, at 203 n.80 (2006)
(noting that “[i]t is common for enterprise software suppliers to have personnel in the customer’s facility or a remote presence on the customer’s computers”).
147. Cf. Blomqvist et al., supra note 63, at 498 (describing research that identifies trust as
one of the critical success factors for asymmetric R&D partnerships).
148. See supra note 136.
149. See, e.g., WELLONS ET AL., supra note 142, at 172 (indicating that in biotech transactions, sometimes “only one or a few people, including the inventor, truly understand how the
invention works and how it can be improved or modified”).
150. Statement of Work (SOW) is a document that details and defines the work products,
deliverables, and timeline for the performance of a project. SOWs are frequently appended
to software development agreements. See, e.g., JAMES TAYLOR, MANAGING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PROJECTS 82 (2004) (describing the functions of SOWs).
151. WELLONS ET AL., supra note 142, at 172 (observing that when a biotech invention is
licensed at an early stage it is often crucial for the licensee to “wrap up” the relevant people).

WINTER 2015]

Constructive Ambiguity

423

In addition, due to the non-rival nature of intellectual property,152 technologies are sometimes simultaneously licensed to
multiple parties on a non-exclusive basis. In such cases, the licensor
(i.e., the IP owner) is generally permitted, motivated, and sometimes expected to continue its efforts to improve, update, and
upgrade the licensed technology. Feedback from existing customers may be extremely valuable during this process. Some licensors
may even request that their licensees test new or improved products, which can further strengthen the parties’ collaboration.
The payment structure prevalent in IP licenses enhances the
need for continuing collaboration and interaction during the term
of license agreements. Payments to licensors are commonly derived
from the licensee’s revenues, often in the form of periodic royalties.153 This payment structure serves as a risk-sharing mechanism in
the face of the uncertain value of the licensed subject matter154 and
is common in various industries, including publishing,155 music,156
and pharmaceuticals.157 This is also the case in the emerging IPTV
field, where the number of subscribers to the IPTV platform may
affect payment to content providers.158 This payment structure further aligns the parties’ interests in their transaction’s success and
motivates their cooperation.159 At the same time, royalty-based
agreements necessitate supervision and surveillance mechanisms,
typically in the form of royalty accounting provisions that allow licensors access to certain portions of a licensee’s confidential
financial information.160 The process of calculating and verifying
152. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
153. See Bessy & Brousseau, supra note 132, at 464 (presenting empirical evidence attesting to the pervasiveness of this payment structure in technology license agreements);
NIMMER, supra note 122, at 523 (discussing the prevalence of this payment structure where
the licensee uses licensed information “for manufacturing, redistribution, or inclusion in
other products”).
154. See, e.g., Bessy & Brousseau, supra note 132, at 464.
155. See, e.g., ALBERTO N. GRECO, JIM MILLIOT & ROBERT M. WHARTON, THE BOOK PUBLISHING INDUSTRY 196 (2013) (describing the typical contractual arrangements regarding royalty
payments in publishing agreements).
156. See, e.g., TODD BRABEC & JEFF BRABEC, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF AUTHORS, COMPOSERS,
PUBLISHERS, Recording Artists Royalties, available at http://www.ascap.com/music-career/arti
cles-advice/music-money/money-recording.aspx.
157. WELLONS ET AL., supra note 142, at 178.
158. See, e.g., Bouwman et al., supra note 12, at 22 (discussing revenue-share arrangements
in the IPTV field).
159. Notably, when the license is provided on an exclusive basis, the licensor may be “in a
position of substantial reliance on the licensee to provide the licensor with a viable commercial return from its property.” NIMMER, supra note 122, at 151.
160. See, e.g., EINHORN & BENSEN, supra note 122, at 1–5 (noting that “when a license is
entered into with running royalties, the contract takes on some relational aspect since there
is a continuing reporting and payment relationship”).
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payments under a royalty-based license increases the intensity of the
parties’ interactions.
Similar commercial dependence exists where a licensee receives
the rights to resell and sublicense the products or services embodying the intellectual property. In that case, the parties may need to
further cooperate to effectively and properly train the licensee’s
staff and to handle additional matters required for successful sublicensing. Altogether, the parties’ ongoing involvement in the
performance of their transaction and their constant interactions
often compel a continuous and multi-faceted collaboration touching upon many facets of the transaction, including technological,
marketing, commercial, and administrative aspects.
These factors illustrate another important relational feature of
license transactions: the mutual dependence that often evolves between the parties to such agreements. Nobel Laureate Oliver
Williamson observed decades ago that even where, initially, markets
offer substitutes, many interactions oblige the parties to make relationship-specific investments so that, once the contract is formed,
“the contracting parties are locked into a bilateral exchange.”161
This astute observation seems particularly valid with respect to IP
licenses. Licensees often depend on the licensor for tacit knowledge and specialized knowhow and may also be subject to the lockin effect that is prevalent in technology markets due to high switching costs and network effects.162 Licensors, likewise, often depend
on licensees’ success to further develop or market their technology,
particularly in exclusive license arrangements.163 In some instances,
licensees utilizing the IP-protected subject matter can affect licensors’ commercial success and reputation and, hence, increase
mutual dependence. Such is the case in trademark licenses, where
the quality of the goods the licensee produces (to which licensor’s
trademark is attached) impacts consumers’ perception of the
mark.164 All these factors increase the parties’ incentive to adhere to
the transaction and resolve their disputes outside litigation.
161. OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISM OF GOVERNANCE 26 (2000); Oliver Williamson,
The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112, 117
(1971). For reflections of these insights in legal literature, see, for example, Goetz & Scott,
supra note 55, at 1101. See also Yuval Procaccia, Revisiting the Efficiency Theory of Non-Contemplated Contingencies in Contract Law, CAN. J. L. & JURIS. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 28),
available at http://.ssrn.com/abstract=2274708 (noting that “[r]eliance causes a party to become ‘invested’ in the particular transaction, and willing to accept less favorable terms—to
ensure that her investment does not go to waste”).
162. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 159.
164. See, e.g., JEROME GILSON & ANNE GILSON LALONDE, 2–6 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 6.04
(LexisNexis 2013) (noting that “[c]ontrol over the nature and quality of the licensee’s goods
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The analysis above supports the general classification of IP license agreements as relational contracts.165 The intricate relations
that evolve between parties throughout the life of the license,166
their mutual dependence,167 and the typically long duration of the
licenses168 all place intellectual property licenses closer to the relational end of the discrete-relational continuum.169
Notably, the relational nature of intellectual property licenses
has been largely overlooked in academic literature,170 and may have
additional implications that justify further inquiry beyond the scope
of this Article’s analysis. For the purposes of this Article, the existence of relational features increases the likelihood the parties
amicably resolve disputes and thus decreases the costs of
ambiguity.171
Interestingly, a recent survey conducted by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) indicates that out of all
technology-related agreements the respondents concluded, only
two percent resulted in litigation or alternative dispute resolution.172 While the study is far from comprehensive,173 its findings
or services is the touchstone of a valid trademark license); SIEGRUN D. KANE, TRADEMARK
LAW—A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 335 (2d ed., 1991) (referring to the licensor’s need to exercise control in order “to ensure that the licensee’s products are of equal quality to the
products previously associated with the licensor’s mark”). Cf. Hadfield, supra note 133, at
949–51 (discussing “[t]he Franchisor’s Problem: Quality Control”).
165. See supra Part II.A.3 for a discussion of relational contracts.
166. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the “relationship”
aspect as a defining feature of relational contracts.
167. See supra notes 74, 82 and accompanying text for a discussion of mutual dependence
in relational contracts.
168. See supra Part III.B for a discussion of the long duration of IP licenses. See supra note
72 and accompanying text for contract duration as an indication of its relational nature.
169. See supra note 77 and accompanying text for a discussion of the discrete-relational
continuum.
170. A prominent exception is Bessy & Brousseau, supra note 132, at 460 (arguing that
technological transactions tend to be governed by relational contracts). See also Vetter, supra
note 144, at 203 n.80 (describing the relational aspects of software vendor-to-customer engagements); Hadfield, supra note 133, at 928; and Spencer, supra note 3 (both discussing the
relational aspects of franchising arrangements).
171. See supra Part II.B.2.
172. WIPO ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION CENTER, INTERNATIONAL SURVEY ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSACTIONS 17 (2013), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/
sites/www/amc/en/docs/surveyresults.pdf.
173. Notably, respondents indicated that among technology-related agreements, licenses
most frequently give rise to disputes, so that the number of litigated licenses may be greater
than two percent. Yet, in light of the overall data, it seems that the percentage of licenses that
reach litigation or ADR is still small. In addition, the survey was confined to technologyrelated licenses, did not address additional types of IP licenses or other contracts, did not
examine the level of ambiguity in the surveyed contracts, and did not investigate the reasons
for the low percentage of litigation and ADR. These matters certainly deserve further empirical investigation.
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support this Article’s analysis: for the vast majority of IP licenses,
the potential costs of ambiguity remain dormant.

C. Inherent Complexity and Uncertainty
Finally, IP markets are often complex and dynamic, and they exhibit relatively high degrees of uncertainty. Although every
commercial transaction is negotiated in the face of uncertainty, this
trait seems especially common for IP licenses and, again, is closely
related to the unique nature of intellectual property rights and
technology markets.174
In some cases, the licensed technology may not be fully developed at the time of contract formation.175 At other times, a
pharmaceutical, an agro-chemical product, or a medical device may
still need to undergo clinical trials or receive the approval of regulatory agencies—a process that often entails significant complexity
and uncertainty.176 Uncertainty in such cases touches upon the very
subject matter of the license transaction.177
In other instances, uncertainty stems from the nature of intellectual property rights themselves. Registration is a pre-requisite for
many IP rights, including, most importantly, patents. Yet, the patent
registration process is often lengthy and may be incomplete at the
time of licensing.178 Eventually, such patents may not be granted.
Even if IP rights are registered when the contract is executed, such

174. See, e.g., Bessy & Brousseau, supra note 132, at 456 (“in technology and innovation,
decisions are made in a radically uncertain environment”); Badawi, supra note 3, at 44 (indicating that “[t]he high technology industry presents a highly uncertain contracting
environment”). Cf. Blomqvist et al., supra note 63, at 499 (noting that uncertainty and risk “in
terms of the final results and the resources needed” are very typical of research and development collaboration).
175. See, e.g., WELLONS ET. AL., supra note 142, at 172 (discussing license agreements vis-avis universities and emphasizing the “long way to market” which characterizes these
transactions).
176. See, e.g., id. at 479–508, 661–76 (2007) (discussing FDA regulation of biomedical
research and the complexity of retaining regulatory approvals for agro-chemical products).
177. Cf. Tirole, supra note 49, at 746 (1999) (referring to R&D contracts and noting that
“the parties are unlikely to be able to describe precisely the specifics of an innovation in an
ex ante contract, given that the research process is precisely concerned with finding out these
specifics”).
178. See, e.g., HAROLD EINHORN & ERIC E. BENSEN, PATENT LICENSING TRANSACTIONS 3–48
(2014) (noting that “[l]icensing negotiations involving new technical developments are often
initiated when patents have not yet issued, but when applications for patent are either on file
or will be filed soon”).
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registration does not immunize the parties against future challenges to the licensed IP’s validity179 or against claims that the
licensed technology infringes third parties’ IP rights.180
Lastly, markets for IP-protected subject matter tend to evolve
quickly as new technologies enter, old technologies become obsolete, and technical standards rise and fall.181 Similarly, the digital
age is witnessing the rapid growth of new content distribution
methods. Predicting new advances during license formation is often
impossible. For example, publishing agreements executed a few decades ago did not foresee the rise of e-books, while broadcasting
rights agreements formed only a decade ago did not anticipate
high-quality streaming of content over the internet or distribution
of content via mobile systems.182 Furthermore, the specific licensed
technology itself may evolve, as a result either of the licensor’s own
efforts or user innovation.183
These inherent complexities and uncertainties make it even
more difficult and costly for parties to foresee and address all relevant contingencies when the license is formed,184 and warrant,
again, a certain degree of ex ante ambiguity in IP license agreements.185 In addition, ambiguity may provide flexibility that is

179. For example, the validity of registered patents may be challenged before the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office through various post-grant procedures and during the course
of litigation. See e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 282, 301–07, 321–29 (2006).
180. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law,
1900-2000, 8 CALIF. L. REV. 2187, 2222 (2000); Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts over
Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United States and the European Union: An Argument for
Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1632, 1637 n.88 (2001).
181. See, e.g., SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 130, at 160 (discussing the rise and fall of
standards in software and other network markets); SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND
INCENTIVES 265 (2004) (noting that knowledge occasionally becomes obsolete, as it is replaced with knowledge or technology that is more advanced).
182. See, e.g., Rosetta Books LLC v. Random House, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y.
2001), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002) (discussing whether publishing license agreements
executed during the 1960s, which granted rights to publish manuscripts “in book form,”
include the right to publish these manuscripts as e-books); cf. Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers v. The Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481 (1998) (discussing whether a license executed in
1939 to distribute Stravinsky’s music in a “motion picture” includes distribution in the subsequently-developed video format).
183. For the robustness of user innovation, see generally ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION (2005); Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent
Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467 (2008); William W. Fisher III, The Implication for Law of User
Innovation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1417 (2010).
184. With respect to the steep transaction costs of technology licensing, see generally
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 839, 847 (1990); Lemley, supra note 120, 1053–54.
185. See supra Part II.B.3.
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particularly important for parties operating in a highly dynamic environment, thereby increasing the robustness of license
transactions.186
****
Part III’s close look at intellectual property licenses reveals that
these agreements constitute paradigmatic candidates for “constructive ambiguity,” due to their long duration, relational nature, and
inherent complexity and uncertainty. These attributes are tightly
related to the unique properties of intellectual property, including
its non-rival nature, the tacit knowledge surrounding formal rights,
and the high uncertainty of both IP rights and IP markets.
Two clarifications are necessary: first, this Article’s analysis does
not apply only to IP licenses. Other types of agreements may exhibit
the ambiguity-friendly traits identified in Part II. Identifying additional categories certainly calls for further research. Second, this
Article’s analysis does not necessarily apply with equal force to all IP
license agreements. The examples above illustrate the vast array of
intellectual property assets and the numerous different types of license arrangements. While the characteristics discussed herein are
generally applicable to various types of IP licenses, certain IP licenses might not meet all of these criteria. Although the foregoing
analysis identified IP licenses, in general, as a classic example for
“constructive ambiguity,” the Article’s normative recommendations
do not mandate a “blanket” tolerant approach toward ambiguity in
all IP transactions. Rather, the proposed model calls for examining
the prevalence and magnitude of the relevant attributes in each
context.
Moreover, even in the paradigmatic cases of IP licenses, ambiguity is not efficient across the board. Part IV focuses on transactions
that are suitable candidates for constructive ambiguity and proposes a set of distinctions that aim to identify issues or provisions
where ambiguity is more warranted and vice versa.
IV. PROPOSED GUIDELINES: FROM CORE

TO

PERIPHERY

This Article’s proposed model for handling contractual ambiguity is dynamic in two separate ways. First, it applies with different
force to various types of contracts, depending on the prevalence of
the attributes discussed in Parts II and III. Second, within a particular transaction, the model balances ambiguity’s costs and benefits
186. See id.
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by delineating circumstances where ambiguity’s advantages are
more pronounced and its costs are lower.
To that end, this Part proposes a distinction between core and
periphery aspects of a transaction. In a nutshell, when the relevant
contractual provision concerns the transaction’s core aspects, ambiguity is generally unwarranted ex ante. On the other hand, if the
provision is closer to the periphery of the transaction, a higher level
of ambiguity is efficient.
Importantly, the distinction between core and periphery is not
dichotomous. More accurately, like other notions discussed in this
Article—such as relational features or ambiguity itself—the core or
peripheral nature of a provision should be measured along a continuum. Based on the analysis in the previous Parts, this Article
identifies three parameters that assist in positioning a provision
along the core-periphery continuum: (1) the probability the relevant
contingency will occur, (2) the ex ante estimated significance of the
consequences of such an occurrence, and (3) the timing—meaning
the stage during the contract’s life—in which the relevant contingency may arise.
Issues are very close to the core of a transaction if there is a high
probability that they will materialize and become relevant shortly
after the contract is formed and if the consequences for the parties
will be significant. Peripheral issues, on the other hand, include low
probability occurrences that are not likely to occur in the immediate period following the execution of the agreement and that, ex
ante, do not appear to entail very significant consequences for the
parties. Admittedly, the classification may not always be clear-cut
and is not infallible: various combinations of these three criteria
may exist, and, at times, the three axes can point in different directions. Overall, however, these parameters provide helpful
guidelines in situating contractual issues along the core-periphery
continuum.
Two of the examples discussed in Part I briefly illustrate this. In a
license for broadcasting rights, the exact platform on which the licensee may broadcast the licensed content is a core issue.187 The
question of where the licensee can broadcast the content would
definitely arise immediately after the license commences and the
licensee begins broadcasting. Its significance for both parties is obvious: the licensee needs to know that the rights granted cover the
platform on which it intends to transmit the content. The licensor
needs to ensure that the license fee is adequate given the nature of
that platform. On the other hand, in a software license agreement,
187. See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text.
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the exact level of certain services the licensor will provide is often
more peripheral.188 While errors or events that require service and
support may arise during the life of the license, their occurrence is
not certain and will not necessarily take place immediately following contract formation. Moreover, the estimated significance of
these issues (for example, whether the licensor will respond to calls
from the licensee within two or four hours) is often relatively low.
When core matters are at stake, parties can generally be expected
to negotiate and draft their arrangement in an unambiguous manner.189 Since such matters constitute the essence of the bargain, the
costs of clarifying them during negotiations are not wasteful but
rather constitute a necessary step in the formation of the contract.190 On the other hand, the potential ex post litigation and
enforcement costs associated with a failure to clarify core matters
are high: these issues are most likely to arise during the life of the
contract. The parties’ ability to resolve them after the contract execution is questionable, given the high stakes involved and the fact
that such matters arise shortly after the relationship has formed,
before “bottom-up” dispute resolution mechanisms have evolved.191
Thus, ambiguity in these contexts is generally unwarranted. As a
result, when core provisions are the focus of the court’s inquiry,
applying a more formal doctrinal approach—for example, refusing
to enforce the contract due to indefiniteness—may be more
appropriate.
On the other hand, ambiguity’s virtues are more apparent and its
potential costs lower for matters reasonably viewed ex ante as peripheral. Where the issue at stake is reasonably perceived as an
improbable or remote scenario, or as an insignificant, low-risk matter, the transaction costs associated with detailed and unambiguous
drafting may outweigh the expected benefits.192 Lengthy and detailed negotiations over peripheral matters may alert the parties to
188. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
189. Cf. Macaulay, supra note 69, at 62–63 (indicating that parties usually exercise care “to
see that both understand the primary obligation on each side”).
190. Losing a deal due to disagreement over core issues is not “inefficient.” See generally
supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
191. For the connection between the ability of the parties to resolve their disputes and
the time elapsed since contract formation, see supra note 85 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. For an example of such a scenario, see
MDS (Canada), Inc. v. RAD Source Techs., Inc., 822 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (S.D. Fla. 2011), concerning a license agreement for a medical device. During the negotiations, the parties
discussed an additional unit that was not yet developed and whose potential was obscure, and
licensor indicated: “We believe that it is important to try to reach agreement on a final deal
as soon as possible and to not to add what could be several months to our discussions by
including the new unit in our negotiations.” Id. at 1304. The issue was eventually left
ambiguous.
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negative contingencies that are, in fact, improbable.193 A negotiation breakdown over such issues is likely inefficient.194 Moreover,
when the relevant contingency might only occur in the relatively
distant future, the parties would likely have established a cooperative and mutually dependent working relationship that may
facilitate an amicable resolution.195 In sum, when the provision in
question is closer to the periphery of the transaction, ambiguity is
often advantageous, while meticulous drafting and exhaustive negotiations are not. Such matters warrant that courts use a more
flexible ex post approach whens reviewing the agreement; an approach that tolerates ambiguity—for example, by completing
contractual gaps—rather than punishes it.
Again, the examples in Part I are illustrative. As the analysis indicates, the broadcasting platform would usually be a core matter in a
broadcasting rights agreement.196 Therefore, the parties should accurately define the platform; referring to it in vague terms (such as
IPTV or “free TV”), without clearly defining these terms, is undesirable.197 Conversely, using open-standard terms like “best efforts,”
“industry standards,” and “reasonable” in a software SLA is often
efficient due to the relatively peripheral nature of these topics.198
Consider, likewise, a software license that addresses the issue of
derivative works the licensee created.199 Assume that the transaction’s principal purpose is licensing an existing, off-the-shelf
software product for the licensee’s internal use. In such circumstances, the prospect that the licensee will create derivative works is
distant and remote from an ex ante perspective. In this Article’s proposed core-periphery continuum, this issue would be closer to the
periphery of the transaction.200 An attempt to explicitly agree upon
the proper way to handle the derivative works scenario could be
costly and even futile. The parties would have almost no information on the nature and potential significance of hypothetical
193. For the possible negative effect of concentrating on “bad” immaterial scenarios, see
supra note 100 and accompanying text. Cf. TALEB, supra note 54, at 127 (maintaining that in
complex systems where “too much information becomes harmful,” people should concentrate on significant signals and ignore noise).
194. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
200. Clearly, under different circumstances, a similar issue could be classified as a core
matter. This may be the case, for example, if the software is provided as a development tool
and the primary purpose of the license is the adaptation and customization of the code by
the licensee.
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derivative works which may never come to be. Therefore, the transaction costs of negotiating detailed arrangements concerning the
works’ commercialization may be prohibitive. In these circumstances, ex ante ambiguity may be preferable.201 Once, if ever, the
derivative works issue arises, the parties will have more concrete information and more established relations that could facilitate
resolution.
Assume now that, eventually, derivative works are created, a dispute arises over the matter, and the case ends up in court. This
Article’s model suggests that a court reviewing the agreement ex post
should adopt a tolerant approach towards the agreement’s ambiguous provisions concerning derivative works. The court could, for
example, refuse to invalidate the license on grounds of indefiniteness and instead fill the contractual gaps, making room for efficient
ambiguity rather than punishing it. The case of MDS v. RAD,202
which had similar circumstances, illustrates such a liberal attitude.
The contested technology, which was peripheral to the transaction
ex ante in this Article’s core-periphery parlance, became very significant after several years, and the parties disputed whether the
technology was included in their license. While addressing the provision’s ambiguity, the court referred to the peripheral nature of
the issue, describing it as “an unforeseen and unrealized future
contingency at the time of contracting,”203 and refused to punish
the parties for leaving the matter ambiguous.204
This Article’s recommendations warrant a contextual approach
to contractual disputes for the initial purpose of categorizing the
transaction and the provisions at stake. In order to determine
whether the relevant transaction would benefit from constructive
ambiguity, courts may need to consider contextual evidence, such
as the relevant markets’ complexity and volatility. Similarly, recourse to contextual evidence may be necessary to position a
particular provision along the core-periphery continuum. The results of this preliminary examination can then direct the courts

201. The arrangement in the license agreement inspected in this context was indeed
ambiguous. License on file with the authors.
202. MDS (Canada), Inc. v. RAD Source Techs., Inc., 822 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (S.D. Fla.
2011).
203. See id. at 1306.
204. See id. at 1306–07 (“[A]n unforeseen and unrealized future contingency at the time
of contracting can be resolved by reasonable contracting parties when the contingency occurs without nullifying the contract.”) (citing O.N. Jonas Co. v. Badische Corp., 706 F.2d
1161, 1165 (11th Cir. 1983)).
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toward a more liberal or formalist approach, pursuant to the proposed guidelines, when addressing the ambiguous provisions in the
subsequent stage.
This Article does not explore in detail the exact impact that its
guidelines may have on the myriad contract law doctrines concerning contractual ambiguity or on the precise manner in which courts
should use this toolbox of rules in particular cases.205 Such an exploration remains a subject for future research. Nevertheless,
highlighting types of contracts and types of issues in which constructive ambiguity can be beneficial would supply the courts with
normative direction in relevant cases. This Article’s guidelines are
also useful to transacting parties and their attorneys, directing them
to concentrate their efforts and resources during negotiations on
the clear drafting of provisions closer to the transaction’s core.206
One potential criticism is autonomy-based. According to this line
of argument, even if the proposed guidelines promote efficiency
and social welfare, they do not confine courts to the four corners of
the agreement but rather assign them a more active role. Arguably,
this may be difficult to reconcile with the other values underlying
contract law—those of consent and autonomy.207 Yet this Article’s
proposal does not necessarily run counter to consent and autonomy. Its analysis illustrates that parties who leave certain areas of
their contract ambiguous may have perfectly valid reasons for doing
so. The discussion of the dynamics of ambiguity further indicates
that sometimes, the parties’ consent to an agreement is only a “second-order” consent. The parties agree on the drafting of a
provision, but the language does not reflect an agreement on the
substance of the matter.
This is particularly true when the issue at stake is more peripheral. Parties in such cases may, in fact, implicitly invite the courts to
intervene and formulate a first-order arrangement should the need
arise.208 This insight may be reinforced when courts’ intervention is
205. For discussion of the doctrinal treatment of ambiguity, see supra Part I.B.
206. Cf. Eggleston et al., supra note 44, at 126 (maintaining that more detail is not always
good when drafting a contract).
207. See generally Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269
(1986).
208. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 7, at 319 (noting that ambiguity can sometimes be an
implicit request for an “equitable adjustment” of the relationship). Cf. Richard E. Speidel,
Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Term Supply Contracts, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 369 (1981)
(arguing that a court-imposed solution to the problem of changed circumstances would do
little damage to contract law’s consent requirement); Speidel, supra note 35, 846 (arguing
that “[i]f the purpose of parties [sic] ex ante contract was to share risk and the technique
chosen to accomplish that purpose fails, a court which seeks to implement that purpose by
considering ex ante events is supporting rather than thwarting the expressed purposes of the
party”).
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part of the legal climate and the parties can rely upon it—or, alternatively, opt out of it—when drafting their contract.209 Thus,
encouraging courts to take context into account and fulfill an active
and more liberal role regarding ambiguity-friendly transactions and
particular provisions does not inevitably conflict with autonomybased rationales of contract law.
Notably, this Article’s proposal does not call for a radical change
in the way courts address ambiguity in contracts. In effect, the
guidelines may largely correlate with what some courts are already
doing in a more intuitive manner.210 In such instances, the value of
this Article’s thesis is mainly interpretive. Yet, providing a structured analysis of contractual ambiguity, while explicitly alerting
courts and parties to relevant factors that so far are either ignored
or only implicitly addressed, can increase consistency among courts
and contribute to the coherence of contract law and doctrine.

CONCLUSION
This Article began with Henry Kissinger’s use of “constructive
ambiguity” in international agreements.211 The journey through the
realm of contractual ambiguity and IP licenses indicates that—despite intuitive reluctance on the part of the legal profession—
ambiguity can be an efficient tool in certain commercial settings as
well.
This Article’s systematic review of ambiguity’s virtues and drawbacks highlights several prominent properties that make a
transaction more disposed to constructive ambiguity. The close
look at IP licenses further demonstrates that such ambiguityfriendly traits commonly exist in these agreements. This is no coincidence: there is a tight connection between these characteristics
and the unique nature of intellectual property, most prominently
its non-rival nature, the tacit knowledge surrounding IP rights, and
the complexity and volatility of IP rights and technology markets.
This Article also demonstrates that, within ambiguity-friendly
transactions, it is possible to delineate certain issues and provisions
209. A prevalent technique for opting-out is an “agreement not to agree” clause which
explicitly defers a certain issue to future agreement. Such a provision can signal the parties’
prior rejection of any type of court-made arrangement with respect to its subject matter, and
allowing judicial intervention in such cases may indeed be problematic from an autonomybased perspective. The Article, therefore, did not include such arrangements in its analysis.
See supra note 23.
210. See supra notes 202–204 and accompanying text.
211. ISAACSON, supra note 1, at 556.
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where ambiguity is particularly efficient. In this context, the Article
proposes a distinction between core and periphery issues that can
assist parties and courts in identifying these circumstances, and provides guidelines for the legal system’s treatment of ambiguity.
These proposals are designed to enhance the system’s ability to
more accurately capture contractual ambiguity’s benefits while minimizing its costs. Although this Article focuses on IP licenses, its
recommendations have broader implications for contract law in
general.
More generally, beyond the issue of contractual ambiguity, this
Article sheds light on the intersection of intellectual property and
commercial contracts. Its findings indicate that this interface certainly deserves further attention, and its future exploration can
benefit both intellectual property and contract law.

